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CRIMINALIZING IMMIGRANT 
ENTREPRENEURS (AND THEIR LAWYERS) 
ERIC FRANKLIN AMARANTE* 
Abstract: To escape the harsh conditions of work in agriculture or food pro-
cessing plants, many undocumented immigrants turn to entrepreneurship for saf-
er working conditions and better economic prospects. Transactional lawyers of-
ten help these entrepreneurs form limited liability companies or worker coopera-
tives. Unfortunately, this simple act might expose these lawyers to criminal lia-
bility. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) prohibits any-
one from encouraging an undocumented person to reside in the United States. 
This prohibition has been construed to include everything from employing un-
documented housekeepers to procuring falsified documents for citizenship appli-
cations, and some courts have even suggested that the encouragement restriction 
can reach legal advice. Although the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have construed IRCA’s encouragement prohibition in a manner that avoids 
constitutional issues, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sineneng-
Smith found IRCA’s encouragement prohibition unconstitutionally overbroad un-
der the First Amendment. This Article argues that the courts that upheld the pro-
hibition rewrote the statute, usurped the legislative authority of Congress, and ig-
nored the chilling effect this statute has on wide swaths of protected and socially 
productive speech. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s decision signaled to 
lawyers and immigrant advocates that providing comfort, inspiration, or other 
forms of encouragement to undocumented people (including legal advice) will 
not be treated as a felony. By refusing to rewrite the statute, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision not only respects Congress’s legislative authority, but it also represents 
sound policy by supporting undocumented entrepreneurship—a boon to the en-
trepreneur, the entrepreneur’s family, and federal, state, and local economies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Some businesses, by their very nature, break the law. For example, an en-
trepreneur cannot take advantage of the nascent marijuana market without vio-
lating federal law,1 no matter how many times former Speaker John Boehner 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2020, Eric Franklin Amarante. All rights reserved. 
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 1 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018). 
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appears in a pro-cannabis commercial.2 And if a business cannot avoid running 
afoul of the law, a lawyer should think twice before helping an entrepreneur 
form such a business. Such lawyers may be subject to ethical sanctions or 
criminal liability.3 But what if an entrepreneur asks a lawyer to help form a 
business to run a fruit stand, a lawn care business, or a home cleaning service? 
What could possibly be problematic about those businesses? 
If the potential business owner is an undocumented immigrant, the an-
swer is not clear. Although there is no law that prohibits undocumented people 
from owning businesses, a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 (IRCA) criminalizes the employment of undocumented immi-
grants (the “Employment Restriction”).4 And under certain circumstances, a 
business owner may be deemed to also be an employee. Thus, when an undoc-
umented business owner is also considered an employee, it would be impossi-
ble to operate an otherwise legal endeavor without violating the law. As a re-
sult, the operation of a fruit stand, a lawn care business, or a home cleaning 
service may be as unlawful under federal law as operating a marijuana dispen-
sary. 
Nonetheless, unlike with the sale of marijuana—which cannot be done 
without violating federal law—an owner of a fruit stand is not always deemed 
to be an employee. Immigrants and immigrant advocates have explored struc-
turing certain legal entities, often worker cooperatives or limited liability com-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Iris Dorbian, Looking to Make Millions from Cannabis? Ex-House Speaker Boehner Will 
Tell You How, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/irisdorbian/2018/10/19/looking-
to-make-millions-from-cannabis-ex-house-speaker-boehner-will-tell-you-how/#6d342b817c52 
[https://perma.cc/74PE-X7L8] (discussing Boehner’s online presentations targeted at an audience of 
cannabis investors). 
 3 Helia G. Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics in the Movement to Le-
galize Marijuana, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 333, 348–51 (2014); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983) (stating that a lawyer “shall not counsel a 
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent”); Ed-
ward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana Businesses, 66 TAX LAW. 429, 
476 (2013) (stating that “[a] lawyer or accountant who is considering providing tax advice to, or pre-
paring the tax return of, a medical marijuana business must take into account the possibility that this 
may subject him or her to criminal liability” and citing 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018) noting, “[w]hoever 
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures 
its commission, is punishable as a principal”); see also Brian Melley, Lawyers Handling Marijuana 
Business Operate in Hazy Legal Zone, INS. J. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2017/12/12/473767.htm [https://perma.cc/9UBZ-F3VJ] (quoting Professor Sam Kamin 
as saying “[a]ny lawyer that goes into this should be aware that a literal reading of federal law permits 
such a [criminal] prosecution”). 
 4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2018) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to 
recruit . . . for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized 
alien . . . .”). 
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panies (LLCs), in a manner that avoids characterizing owners as employees.5 
This is possible due to the relatively complex interaction between the legal 
definition of “employees” and the rules governing worker cooperatives and 
LLCs. Due to this complexity, undocumented entrepreneurs are wise to seek 
legal assistance before forming such businesses.6 
Luckily, many transactional lawyers are eager to help.7 Although transac-
tional lawyers have long “felt helpless” in the face of the myriad injustices im-
posed upon undocumented people,8 they are perfectly suited to navigate the 
complex web of laws that governs undocumented entrepreneurship.9 The very 
knowledge needed—an intimate understanding of corporate governance, entity 
formation, and employment law—sits squarely in the expertise of transactional 
lawyers. As a result, many transactional lawyers have helped undocumented 
immigrants structure businesses in a manner that avoids IRCA’s Employment 
Restriction. 
Although such lawyers may successfully avoid their client’s potential lia-
bility under IRCA’s Employment Restriction, a lawyer in this practice would 
be wise to review another section of IRCA, which makes it a felony to “en-
courage[] . . . an alien to . . . reside in the United States” (the “Encouragement 
Restriction”).10 This language, on its face, criminalizes any efforts to encour-
age undocumented people and is broad enough to potentially criminalize a 
transactional lawyer’s advice on how to structure a business in a manner that 
avoids IRCA’s Employment Restriction. In fact, some prosecutors have argued 
that legal advice is covered by this statute.11 Thus, IRCA’s Encouragement Re-
                                                                                                                           
 5 Cindy Carcamo, Immigrants Lacking Papers Work Legally—As Their Own Bosses, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm-2013-sep-14-la-na-ff-immigration-business-
20130915-story.html [https://perma.cc/5X8G-J3AA]. 
 6 But see id. (describing the experience of Carla Chavarria, an undocumented immigrant, with 
forming a business). The article notes: 
At a workshop hosted by immigrant rights activists, Chavarria learned about these intri-
cacies of labor law—and how to register as a limited liability company. “I didn’t know 
it was possible,” Chavarria said. “And it wasn’t that hard.” It was as easy as download-
ing the forms from the Internet, opening up a bank account and turning in paperwork to 
the state along with a $50 fee. 
Id. 
 7 See Gowri J. Krishna, Growing the Resistance: A Call to Action for Transactional Lawyers in 
the Era of Trump, 7 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 206, 217–21 (2018). 
 8 See id. at 207 (describing how transactional attorneys “felt helpless and at a loss for how to use 
their legal skills” to assist undocumented immigrants). 
 9 See generally id. (outlining a variety of ways in which transactional attorneys have assisted 
undocumented immigrants). 
 10 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 11 See United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191, 203 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[T]he government 
contended that an immigration lawyer would be prosecutable for the federal felony created by 
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striction might dissuade lawyers from engaging in this advocacy in the absence 
of clear guidance from courts.12 Unfortunately, appellate court decisions on the 
application and reach of the Encouragement Restriction are at best uneven, and 
at worst, conflicting.13 Meanwhile, undocumented entrepreneurs and immi-
grant advocates are stuck in limbo as courts wrestle with the appropriate reach 
of IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction. 
This Article explores the potential criminal liability imposed by IRCA’s 
Encouragement Restriction when a lawyer helps an undocumented entrepre-
neur form a business specifically designed to avoid IRCA’s Employment Re-
striction. Part I discusses how courts have construed the Encouragement Re-
striction, including a detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Sineneng-Smith, which held that IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction is 
unconstitutionally overbroad.14 Part II will discuss the phenomenon of undoc-
umented entrepreneurship and the factors which make business ownership at-
tractive to undocumented people.15 This Part also includes an exploration of 
preferred legal entities for such businesses.16 Part III discusses IRCA’s Em-
ployment Restriction and explains why transactional lawyers structure such 
businesses as worker cooperatives and LLCs in a manner that avoids the re-
striction.17 Part IV turns to policy by arguing that a strict interpretation of IR-
CA’s Encouragement Restriction not only affects immigrant entrepreneurship, 
but might also chill other legal advice to undocumented people.18 This Part 
closes with a discussion of some of the unintended consequences of adopting 
an expansive view of the Encouragement Restriction.19 
                                                                                                                           
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) if he advised an illegal alien client to remain in the country because if the alien 
were to leave the alien could not return to seek adjustment of status.”). 
 12 See Brief for Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project & the National Immigration Project of 
the National Lawyers Guild in Response to the Court’s Order Dated September 18, 2017, at 1, United 
States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-10614) (“Amici are concerned that the 
[Encouragement Restriction] can and will be used to criminalize and thwart advocacy on behalf of 
immigrants due to the provision’s sweeping scope and uncertain reach.”). 
 13 Compare DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props. Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (requiring 
“substantial” support akin to “an affirmative act that serve[s] as a catalyst for aliens to reside in the 
United States”), with Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 467–68, 485 (holding the Encouragement Provision 
to be “unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment”). 
 14 See infra notes 20–121 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 122–191 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 192–223 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 224–293 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 294–343 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 294–343 and accompanying text. 
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I. CRIMINAL ENCOURAGEMENT 
 This Part provides the background necessary to understand the Encour-
agement Restriction of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.20 
Section A discusses relevant vocabulary and the rationale for selecting the 
terms “undocumented,” “immigrant,” and “people” rather than “illegal” or “al-
ien.”21 Section B discusses court decisions that interpret the meaning of im-
permissible encouragement per IRCA’s Encouragement Restrictions.22 
A. “The Game of the Name”23 
Before discussing IRCA’s Encouragement Restrictions and the phenome-
non of undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs, it is wise to take a moment to 
consider vocabulary. When referring to people who are physically present in 
the United States without proper documentation, this Article intentionally uses 
“undocumented” as opposed to “illegal,” and will refer to “immigrants” or 
“people” as opposed to “aliens.” The words used in immigration debates are 
fraught with meaning, prejudicial and otherwise. By way of example, consider 
that the federal law refers to people without appropriate documentation as “al-
iens.”24 Despite the facially inoffensive definition of “alien” as someone “from 
another country,”25 many immigrant activists26 and governments (including the 
State of California)27 have taken steps to cease using “alien” to refer to people 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 21–121 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 23–43 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 44–121 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Steven Pinker, The Game of the Name, BALT. SUN (Apr. 6, 1994), https://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-04-06-1994096202-story.html [https://perma.cc/H49S-Z8SK] (highlight-
ing the importance of word choice and vocabulary as “language . . . relates to thoughts and attitudes”). 
 24 See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(a) (2020) (defining the term “unauthorized alien”). 
 25 See Jose Antonio Vargas, I’m Not an ‘Alien,’ L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.latimes.
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0814-vargas-illegal-alien-20150813-story.html [https://perma.cc/8975-XM2G]. 
Vargas writes: 
There are those who say that “alien” is a perfectly fine, neutral term, and that anyone 
who finds it offensive is playing word police and should just check the dictionary. The 
second definition, in Merriam Webster: “from another country.” Sting’s pop song, 
“Englishman in New York,” joyfully repeats “I’m a legal alien” in the chorus. Ian 
Whitcomb, another English pop singer, wrote a memoir called “Resident Alien.” 
Id. 
 26 See Lauren Gambino, ‘No Human Being Is Illegal’: Linguists Argue Against Mislabeling of 
Immigrants, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/06/
illegal-immigrant-label-offensive-wrong-activists-say [https://perma.cc/Y54Q-JYTU] (“‘We don’t 
call pedestrians who cross in the middle of the road illegal pedestrians,’ said [UCLA Professor] Otto 
Santa Ana . . . .”). 
 27 See S.B. 432, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); see also Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown 
Doesn’t Want California to Use This Word for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.
latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-gov-jerry-brown-signs-bills-to-help-immigrants-20150810-
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in the country without proper documentation.28 This is because the word “al-
ien,” quite literally, exoticizes and otherizes those from foreign countries, and 
conscientious people have advocated to avoid its usage.29 
For similar reasons, this Article will not use the word “illegal” to refer to 
people in the United States without proper documentation, nor will it use “ille-
gal” as a modifier for “immigrant.” The word “illegal,” similar to “alien,” car-
ries a significant negative connotation.30 For this reason, the term has become 
disfavored by a number of major news outlets.31 
To critics, these choices are merely an indulgence for the unduly sensitive 
and little more than a nicety for the thin-skinned.32 It is clear, however, that 
                                                                                                                           
story.html [https://perma.cc/L6SP-UJ22] (noting a bill that removed the word “alien” from Califor-
nia’s labor code). 
 28 See Vargas, supra note 25 (“‘Alien’ is now commonly considered a derogatory term for a for-
eign-born person and has very negative connotations. The United States is a country of immigrants 
who not only form an integral part of our culture and society but are also critical contributors to our 
economic success.” (quoting state Senator Tony Mendoza)). 
 29 See Emily Bazelon, The Unwelcome Return of ‘Illegals,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/magazine/the-unwelcome-return-of-illegals.html [https://perma.
cc/F2HF-L9GB] (“The term of art that statutes and courts have used since the 18th century—‘alien’—
hardly bridges the gap. It comes from the Latin for ‘of or belonging to others,’ and was codified in the 
first federal law that addressed granting citizenship to foreigners . . . .”). Bazelon also points out that 
the history of its use betrays a racial component of the acceptability of certain “aliens” that is deeply 
offensive. See id. (noting that the first law to use this term “allowed for naturalizing only an ‘alien’ 
who was a ‘free white person’”). 
 30 See id. (noting that this term “implies suspicion”); see also Dan Merica, Clinton Says Her Use 
of Term ‘Illegal Immigrant’ Was a ‘Poor Choice of Words,’ CNN (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.cnn.
com/2015/11/24/politics/hillary-clinton-illegal-immigration-undocumented-immigrants/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YVJ-38US]. 
 31 See Drop the I-Word, RACE FORWARD: CTR. FOR RACIAL JUST. INNOVATION, https://www.
raceforward.org/practice/tools/drop-i-word [https://perma.cc/U538-MGYT] (quantifying the use of 
“illegal immigrant” by The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and The Associated 
Press). The article noted:  
Since officially dropping [the use of “illegal immigrant”] in 2013, The Associated Press 
has consistently been the best performer of these four major national outlets. While The 
Washington Post has steadily improved its coverage each year, it has also consistently 
been the worst offender of the four outlets studied. Although The New York Times nev-
er officially pledged to drop [the use of “illegal immigrant”], it has the second best rec-
ord of the four outlets studie[d]. However, some of the publication’s leading immigra-
tion reporters continue to use the term. 
Id.; see also Stephen Hiltner, Illegal, Undocumented, Unauthorized: The Terms of Immigration Report-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/insider/illegal-undocumented-
unauthorized-the-terms-of-immigration-reporting.html [https://perma.cc/2PCG-ZHHR]. 
 32 See, e.g., Hans A. von Spakovsky, “Undocumented Immigrant” Is a Made-Up Term That Ignores 
the Law, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 30, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/
undocumented-immigrant-made-term-ignores-the-law [https://perma.cc/YPX8-ZDVD] (“‘Undocu-
mented immigrant’ is a politically correct, made-up term adopted by pro-illegal alien advocacy groups 
and liberal media outlets to obscure the fact that such aliens have violated U.S. immigration law and are 
in the country illegally.”); see also Gene Demby, In Immigration Debate, ‘Undocumented’ Vs. ‘Ille-
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many anti-immigrant advocates use the term “illegal” to dehumanize immi-
grants. This practice has become so commonplace that such advocates, bris-
tling at the perception of creeping political correctness, have weaponized the 
use of “illegal” as a substitute for either “alien” or “immigrant” to signal an 
aggressively anti-immigrant political stance.33 For these reasons, the term “un-
documented immigrant” has grown in favor among immigrant activists.34 In-
deed, a number of activists have adopted “No One Is Illegal” as a rallying 
cry,35 echoing Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel’s famous proclamation.36 It is in this 
spirit that this Article will refer to people in the United States without appro-
priate documentation as “undocumented.”37 
This choice is not without its critics.38 In 2018, the Justice Department di-
rected U.S. attorneys to use the term “illegal alien” rather than “undocumented 
immigrant” to more closely track the language of the relevant statutes.39 Fur-
                                                                                                                           
gal’ Is More Than Just Semantics, NPR (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/
2013/01/30/170677880/in-immigration-debate-undocumented-vs-illegal-is-more-than-just-semantics 
[https://perma.cc/J2JK-MSS9]. 
 33 See, e.g., von Spakovsky, supra note 32; see also Illegal Alien or “Undocumented Immigrant?,” 
FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM (June 2009), http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/illegal-
alien-or-undocumented-immigrant [https://perma.cc/56P5-XJM5]. The article found:  
The enablers of illegal aliens have engaged in a “political correctness” campaign in an at-
tempt to suppress use of the legally recognized term “illegal alien” often asserting that “a 
person cannot be illegal.” Their alternative term is “undocumented immigrant.” This term 
blurs the distinction between legally admitted immigrants and those who have sneaked in-
to the country or chosen to violate the terms of a legal entry. They have even gone so far 
as to advance their “political correctness” efforts in legal journals and in the courts. 
Illegal Alien or “Undocumented Immigrant?,” supra. 
 34 See Demby, supra note 32 (“‘Undocumented’ and ‘illegal’ seem to be [about] signaling one’s 
stance when it comes to immigration reform [rather] than . . . about characterizing the situation in a 
precise way” (quoting linguistic anthropologist Jonathan Rosa)).  
 35 See NO ONE IS ILLEGAL—TORONTO, https://toronto.nooneisillegal.org [https://perma.cc/T3N7-
QHJR]. See generally JUSTIN AKERS CHACÓN & MIKE DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RAC-
ISM AND STATE VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER (2006). 
 36 Elie Wiesel, The Refugee, 34 CROSSCURRENTS 385, 388 (Winter 1984–1985). Famously, Mr. 
Wiesel wrote: “You who are so-called illegal aliens must know that no human being is ‘illegal.’ That 
is a contradiction in terms. Human beings can be beautiful or more beautiful, can be right or wrong, 
but illegal? How can a human being be illegal?” Id. 
 37 The Supreme Court of California wrestled with this decision and came to the same conclusion. 
In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 120 n.1 (Cal. 2014) (noting that “[a]lthough no shorthand term may be 
perfect,” the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that this choice “avoids the potential problematical con-
notations of alternative terms”). 
 38 See id. at 135 (Chin, J., concurring) (“The term ‘undocumented immigrant’ is vague and is not 
used in the relevant statutes. It is also euphemistic, because it is unlawful to be in this country and to 
be undocumented in the sense in which defendants use the term.”). 
 39 Tal Kopan, Justice Department: Use ‘Illegal Aliens,’ Not ‘Undocumented,’ CNN (July 24, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/24/politics/justice-department-illegal-aliens-undocumented/
index.html [https://perma.cc/JVU9-7EGR]. 
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ther, even some institutions that recognize the problematic nature of the term 
“illegal immigrant” suggest that alternatives may not be appropriate. For ex-
ample, while the New York Times urges its reporters to avoid the use of “illegal 
immigrant,” it also warns reporters to temper use of “undocumented” because 
“it has a flavor of euphemism and should be used with caution outside quota-
tion.”40 Professor Steven Pinker argues that the use of such terms are a part of 
a self-defeating “euphemism treadmill” which ultimately results in negative 
associations with the new terms.41 Although such concerns have some merit, 
the use of the term “undocumented immigrant” reflects an attempt to respect 
the right of marginalized populations to self-identify.42 Even critics of euphe-
mistic language might agree with this approach. Pinker, for example, in an es-
say castigating the spread of unbridled political correctness, said “[r]espect 
means treating people as they wish to be treated, beginning with names.”43 
B. Defining Impermissible Encouragement 
On its face, IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction prohibits an absurd 
amount of activity. The statute imposes liability upon anyone who “encourages 
or induces [an undocumented immigrant] to come to, enter, or reside in the 
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, 
entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.”44 Given that impermissible 
encouragement could conceivably consist of little more than turning to an un-
documented person and saying “I encourage you to stay in the United 
States,”45 it is not outlandish to conclude that impermissible encouragement 
might include most forms of socially productive and desirable interactions. 
Part II of this Article discusses the potential reach of this prohibition—
including how it might dissuade a lawyer advising an undocumented person to 
form a business—but first, this Section will explore how courts have construed 
this statute. 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Hiltner, supra note 31.  
 41 Pinker, supra note 23.  
 42 See Vargas, supra note 25. 
 43 Pinker, supra note 23. To be sure, Professor Pinker did not argue that such respect automatical-
ly militates toward adopting politically correct terms. See id. Pinker noted that “[p]eople invent new 
‘polite’ words to refer to emotionally laden or distasteful things, but the euphemism becomes tainted 
by association and the new one that must be found acquires its own negative connotations.” Id. But 
regardless of the author’s differences with Pinker’s ultimate conclusions, the maxim that one ought to 
treat people “as they wish to be treated” is one upon which, hopefully, everyone can agree. See id. 
 44 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 45 See Sineneng-Smith, 901 F.3d at 479 (concluding that a person who makes such a statement 
would be “vulnerable to prosecution” under the statute’s Encouragement Restriction). 
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1. “[Y]ou can’t leave, don’t leave.”46 
Perhaps the first decision to question the potential reach of IRCA’s En-
couragement Restriction in depth was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit’s 2012 opinion in DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties.47 In DelRio-
Mocci, the court considered how IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction applied to 
a landlord who sought out undocumented people as tenants under the assump-
tion that undocumented people were less willing to file complaints about sub-
standard housing.48 The court noted that successful claims under IRCA’s anti-
harboring provision must include evidence that the defendant took actions that 
“substantially facilitated” an undocumented person’s ability to remain in the 
United States.49 This must go beyond “general advice,” and must amount to 
“some affirmative assistance that makes an alien lacking lawful immigration 
status more likely to enter or remain in the United States than she otherwise 
might have been.”50 
 In coming to this conclusion, the court expressed concern about the po-
tential breadth of IRCA, stating that “reading the [Encouragement Restriction] 
too broadly risks rendering the remaining subsections of [IRCA] redundant or 
superfluous.”51 In this manner, the DelRio-Mocci court imposed a substantiali-
ty requirement to limit the reach of the Encouragement Restriction.52 The court 
found support for this interpretation by surveying other circuit decisions53 and 
ultimately concluded that the decisions only found liability “where defendants 
were personally involved in bringing aliens lacking lawful immigration status 
into the United States.”54 To rule otherwise, the court said, would result in a 
statute that criminalized “giving any type of ‘help’ to an [undocumented immi-
grant], no matter how de minimis the assistance . . . .”55 
The DelRio-Mocci court recognized the potential breadth of the Encour-
agement Restriction and interpreted the statute in a narrow manner. As such, 
the DelRio-Mocci court’s criticism of the statute is relatively subdued. This is 
not the case in United States v. Henderson, a 2012 U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts case that cited DelRio-Mocci extensively.56 Hender-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
 47 See 672 F.3d at 248–50. 
 48 Id. at 244. 
 49 Id. at 248. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 249. 
 52 Id. at 248–50. 
 53 See Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lopez, 590 
F.3d 1238, 1249–52 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 54 DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 250. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 205–10. 
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son involved the prosecution of Lorraine Henderson, a Field Office employee 
of the Department of Homeland Security, who repeatedly paid an undocument-
ed woman, Fabiana Bitencourt, for cleaning services.57 Henderson made these 
payments with knowledge of Bitencourt’s undocumented status and Henderson 
repeatedly encouraged Bitencourt to stay in the United States, telling her “if 
you leave they won’t let you back” and “you can’t leave, don’t leave.”58 
Ultimately, and with great reluctance, the Henderson court held that these 
facts represented evidence sufficient to support a conviction under IRCA’s En-
couragement Restriction.59 But to say that the Henderson decision was deliv-
ered with great reluctance is something of an understatement.60 The court is 
quite transparent in its distaste for the “stern, solemn, and implacable sancti-
mony of the government,” and admits it is “puzzled” by the government’s re-
lentless pursuit in light of “the pedestrian quality of the conduct that is at the 
core of this felony prosecution.”61 
The government’s argument in Henderson is fairly straightforward and 
appears to arise from a literal reading of the Encouragement Restriction. The 
government argued that “separately or together, Henderson’s employment of, 
and advice to, Bitencourt were felonious.”62 In terms of the employment alone, 
the government’s position was that “any homemaker who intermittently engages 
an individual cleaning lady to clean the homemaker’s residence, knowing the 
cleaning lady is an illegal alien, would be prosecutable as a federal felon” under 
IRCA’s Employment Restriction.63 This is not controversial. More upsetting was 
the government’s argument that Henderson’s simple advice—which included the 
statements “if you leave they won’t let you back” and “you can’t leave, don’t 
leave”—constituted a violation of the Encouragement Restriction.64 
The Henderson court grudgingly agreed with the government’s argument, 
but took steps to communicate its discomfort with the breadth of the Encour-
agement Restriction. The Henderson court was appalled at the notion that the 
prohibition might permit prosecutions of “immigration lawyers for advising 
illegal aliens regarding the circumstances under which they may pursue ad-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. at 194–96. 
 58 Id. at 195–97. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. at 193 (“I view the pursuit of this case to have been overkill through the improvident 
invocation of federal criminal felony process when alternative administrative sanctions more closely 
tailored to the significance of the misconduct are available and adequate.”). 
 61 Id. at 193–94. 
 62 Id. at 200. 
 63 Id. at 203. 
 64 See id. at 196, 203 (“The legal logic of the government’s position is that such employment 
‘encourages’ or ‘induces’ an illegal alien to reside in the country by providing an economic incentive 
to do so.”). 
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justment in status.”65 The Henderson court rejected any comfort found in the 
fact that such a case has not yet been pursued, noting that the lack of prosecu-
tions can be attributed solely to the grace of prosecutorial discretion.66 The 
Henderson court ended its opinion with an observation that amounts to a warn-
ing: “The lessons of proportionate restraint while pursuing measured judg-
ment, in the face of unreasoning outrage, require careful calibration of the lev-
el of culpability for modest misconduct. These are lessons often difficult to 
accept, master, and deliver.”67 This thinly veiled condemnation of the govern-
ment’s unreasonably zealous prosecution doubled as a powerful argument that 
any attempted prosecution of activity that amounts to “encouraging or induc-
ing,” and nothing more, would be injudicious. Although the Henderson court 
viewed the government’s prosecution as “improvident,” and called the use of 
IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction in this case “overkill,” the court was forced 
to agree that the defendant’s actions constituted impermissible encouragement 
under the plain meaning of the statute.68 
2. “[T]o knowingly instigate, help or advise.”69 
A number of other circuits have wrestled with the potential reach of IR-
CA’s Encouragement Statute, resulting in a slew of conflicting decisions that 
fail to provide a coherent definition of what, precisely, constitutes impermissi-
ble encouragement or inducement under IRCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit has followed the lead of DelRio-Mocci, holding that any suc-
cessful prosecution for encouraging or inducing must include a substantial 
act.70 For example, in United States v. Thum, the Ninth Circuit held in 2014 
that “escorting [an undocumented immigrant] from a fast food restaurant near 
the border to a nearby vehicle” would not constitute impermissible encour-
agement or inducement without an accompanying substantial action.71 The 
Thum court concluded that culpability requires “some action” that persuades 
the undocumented immigrant to “live in the country indefinitely,” such as 
providing false identification documents for a citizenship application.72 In this 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See id. at 211–12. 
 66 See id. at 212 (“To date [the government] understandably has not chosen to press the statute 
that far.”). 
 67 Id. at 214. 
 68 See id. at 193. The court makes no effort to hide its disdain, especially given the availability of 
“alternative administrative sanctions more closely tailored to the significance of the misconduct . . . .” 
Id. 
 69 United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 70 See United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 71 Id. at 1144, 1148. 
 72 See id. at 1148 (noting that other cases find that “a defendant ‘encourages’ an illegal alien to 
‘reside’ in the United States when the defendant takes some action ‘to convince the illegal alien to . . . 
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manner, the Ninth Circuit followed the DelRio-Mocci court and heeded the 
warnings of Henderson, making it clear that any prosecutions for mere encour-
agement or inducement would not be upheld in the Ninth Circuit. 
Thum echoes the holding in United States v. Oloyede, a 1992 U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit case that also required a substantial act to 
support any finding of impermissible encouragement.73 In Oloyede, the sub-
stantial act amounted to a defendant not only selling fraudulent documents, but 
also telling undocumented immigrants that the documents would allow them to 
remain in the United States and even travel back to their country of origin 
without negative consequences.74 Although the Oloyede court did not directly 
address whether the defendant’s statements, on their own, would constitute 
impermissible encouragement, it strongly suggested that the provision of 
fraudulent documents was a determinative factor by noting that “[t]he selling 
of fraudulent documents and immigration papers . . . constitutes ‘encourages’ 
as that word is used in the statute.”75 
In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to a simi-
lar conclusion in United States v. He, which upheld a conviction under the En-
couragement Restriction.76 In He, the defendant objected to the definition of 
“encourage” as “to knowingly instigate, help or advise,” which was included in 
a supplemental jury instruction.77 Notably, this definition does not require any 
substantial act, leaving the jury free to determine that mere instigation, help, or 
advice would suffice for a conviction. Similar to the defendant in Lopez, how-
ever, the broadness of this definition was not necessary given the defendant’s 
actions. Consider the fact that the defendant in He was accused of altering a 
passport, completing a falsified customs declaration form, and coaching an 
undocumented person to disclaim knowledge of the defendant.78 Such actions 
would certainly have fulfilled any substantially requirement and clearly in-
volve more than mere instigation, help, or advice. 
Thum, Oloyede, and He suggest something akin to a consensus with Del-
Rio-Mocci, but other circuits have not followed suit. For example, in United 
States v. Lopez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2009 up-
                                                                                                                           
stay in this country,’ or to facilitate the alien’s ability to live in this country indefinitely”) (citations 
omitted). 
 73 See id. at 1146–48; United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]hey could 
continue to work in the United States[,] . . . they would not be subject to the threat of imminent detec-
tion and deportation, and . . . they could travel back to their homeland without risk of being prevented 
from returning . . . .”). 
 74 See Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 137. 
 75 See id. 
 76 He, 245 F.3d at 957, 961. 
 77 See id. at 957 (objecting on the grounds that these definitions were too broad). 
 78 Id. at 956–57.  
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held a conviction for impermissible encouragement when the jury was in-
structed that “encourage” meant “to knowingly instigate, to incite to action, to 
give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to raise confidence, to help, to for-
ward, and/or to advise.”79 The Lopez court held that merely “helping” can con-
stitute criminal behavior, noting that “in other decisions in this circuit, the 
act[s] of ‘helping’ aliens come to, enter, or remain in the United States were 
deemed violations of [the Encouragement Restriction].”80 Although this lan-
guage suggests that mere encouragement would support a successful prosecu-
tion under IRCA, the defendant’s actions in Lopez would probably have satis-
fied the “substantial action” required by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. In de-
scribing the defendant’s actions, the Lopez court pointed out that the defendant 
“first had to take a boat to the Bahamas, refuel it, spend the night, pick up the 
aliens from an abandoned hotel, and then go to the marina and come back to 
the United States.”81 This litany of actions would appear to constitute a “sub-
stantial” act, but the Lopez court did not directly address the question. 
Thus, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had the opportunity to come to a 
similar conclusion as the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits and require the 
prosecution to show some substantial act before a conviction under the En-
couragement Restriction would be appropriate. The fact that they did not might 
explain why the Ninth Circuit in Sineneng-Smith found that the Encourage-
ment Restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.82 
3. “I encourage you to stay here.”83 
Evelyn Sineneng-Smith, the manager of an immigration consulting firm, 
repeatedly promised clients legal permanent residence through a long-defunct 
labor certification program.84 Sineneng-Smith’s advice was largely directed at 
Filipino clients who were “unlawfully employed in the home health care indus-
try.”85 Despite knowing that the labor certification was not a viable route for 
permanent residency, Sineneng-Smith told clients she could ultimately help 
them obtain green cards through the program.86 Relying on her advice, two of 
the individuals she represented testified that “they would have left the country 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1247. 
 80 Id. at 1251 (citing United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 81 Id. at 1252. 
 82 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485. 
 83 Id. at 467. 
 84 See id. at 468 (noting that the Labor Certification program ceased to operate in 2001). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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if Sineneng-Smith had told them that they were not eligible for permanent res-
idence.”87 
Recognizing the lack of guidance on the appropriate breadth of IRCA’s En-
couragement Restriction, the Ninth Circuit solicited amici curiae to address, 
among other questions, whether the Encouragement Restriction is “overbroad 
under the First Amendment, and if so, whether any permissible limiting con-
struction would cure the First Amendment problem.”88 Ultimately, the court held 
that IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction was unconstitutionally overbroad.89 
a. Constructing and Reconstructing the Encouragement Restriction 
A statute is impermissibly broad under the First Amendment if it reaches 
a substantial amount of protected speech, considered in light of the legitimate 
reach of the statute.90 On the other hand, a statute may survive an overbreadth 
challenge if the statute can be construed in such a manner that avoids “consti-
tutional doubts.”91 Indeed, this is the course the DelRio-Mocci court took with 
the application of the substantiality requirement.92 In addition, this interpreta-
tion was likely on the mind of the government when it argued that the statute 
should be construed as to only apply to substantial acts.93 More specifically, 
the government argued that the Encouragement Restriction only applies when 
a person “(1) knowingly undertakes, (2) a non-de-minimis, (3) act that, (4) 
could assist, (5) a specific alien (6) in violating, (7) civil or criminal immigra-
tion laws.”94 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. at 469. 
 89 Id. at 485; see also Lauren D. Allen, Illegal Encouragement: The Federal Statute That Makes It 
Illegal to “Encourage” Immigrants to Come to the United States and Why It Is Unconstitutionally Over-
broad, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1205, 1233–39 (2019) (arguing that, under the overbreadth doctrine, IRCA’s 
Encouragement Restriction is unconstitutional). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit considered an over-
breadth challenge to the Encouragement Restriction in United States v. Tracy. See 456 F. App’x 267 (4th 
Cir. 2011). The Tracy court held “that speech . . . that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting does not 
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.” Id. at 272 (quoting Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 
F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1997)). The Ninth Circuit addressed this holding and pointed out the differ-
ences between aiding and abetting statutes and the Encouragement Restriction, highlighting the fact 
that “[j]ust two lines below [the Encouragement Restriction], Congress required that anyone who ‘aids 
or abets the commission of any of the preceding acts’ shall be punished as a principal.” See Sineneng-
Smith, 901 F.3d at 482 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)).  
 90 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (“[A] law may be invalidated as over-
broad if ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the stat-
ute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 
U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008))). 
 91 Id. at 481.  
 92 See DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 241, 246–51. 
 93 See Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 471. 
 94 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit, however, was unwilling to follow the DelRio-Mocci 
court’s interpretation. Although admitting that courts should follow the canon 
of constitutional avoidance—that is, to construct statutes in a manner that 
avoids raising questions of constitutional law—the Sineneng-Smith court held 
it would be inappropriate to do so when constitutional avoidance requires a court 
to effectively rewrite the statute in question. To do so, according to the court, 
“would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain, and sharply di-
minish Congress’ incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place.”95 
To adopt the government’s construction—which, in effect, requires courts to add 
“an act requirement, a substantiality requirement, and a causation require-
ment”—would amount to redrafting the statute.96 Instead, the Ninth Circuit em-
braced the following, rather straight-forward, construction of the statute: 
[T]o violate [the Encouragement Restriction], a defendant must 
knowingly encourage or induce a particular alien—or group of al-
iens—to come to, enter, or reside in the country in reckless disregard 
of whether doing so would constitute a violation of the criminal or 
civil immigration laws on the part of the alien.97 
In a similar vein, the Sineneng-Smith court rejected the government’s argument 
that the words “encourage” and “induce” refer to “specific actions that facili-
tate” an undocumented person’s actions.98 This argument appeared to be de-
signed to limit the prohibited activity to specific actions, as opposed to poten-
tially protected expression. The Ninth Circuit, however, called this interpreta-
tion “strained,” and instead adopted the plain meaning of the words because to 
do otherwise “would require [the court] to conclude that ‘encourage’ does not 
mean encourage.”99 To highlight the absurdity of the government’s suggested 
construction, the Ninth Circuit asserted: 
[U]nder the government’s reading of the statute, it would argue that 
a mother telling an undocumented adult child “If you leave the 
United States, I will be very lonely. I encourage you to stay and re-
side in the country” would not subject the mother to prosecution. 
But, in this example, the mother is merely repeating the words of the 
statute in an attempt to get her child to stay. We think any reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 481). 
 96 Id. at 477 (citing DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 246–48). 
 97 Id. at 472. 
 98 Id. at 474–75. 
 99 Id. 
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person reading the [Encouragement Restriction] would assume that 
the mother’s statement makes her vulnerable to prosecution . . . .100 
b. The Encouragement Restriction Reaches Protected Speech 
Having settled on the proper construction of the Encouragement Re-
striction, the Ninth Circuit turned to the second prong of the overbreadth anal-
ysis: whether the statute, as properly construed, restricts protected speech.101 
The court first considered whether such speech might be considered either in-
citement or speech integral to criminal conduct. If so, the restriction would be 
upheld as proper, as these are the two exceptions to the rule against overly 
broad speech restrictions. On the incitement issue, the court emphasized the 
temporal aspect of the exclusion, noting that the government may proscribe 
speech that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”102 However, because the Encourage-
ment Restriction “does not require that an [undocumented immigrant] immi-
nently violate the immigration law,” the Ninth Circuit held that “the incitement 
doctrine is a poor fit for this particular statute.”103 The court conceded that the 
statute may reach some categories of speech “exempted from the First 
Amendment as incitement,” but if any such speech exists, the court concluded 
that “it is an extremely narrow band of speech and does not significantly re-
duce the scope of the statute.”104 
The court also rejected the argument that the restricted speech is integral 
to criminal conduct. For this argument, the government contended that the En-
couragement Restriction prohibits actions that aid or abet criminal conduct. 
The court did not agree for a number of reasons. First, the court was troubled 
by the fact that the Encouragement Restriction applies to both civil and crimi-
nal violations.105 To hold that the Encouragement Restriction was valid as an 
aiding and abetting statute would represent an extension of the aiding and abet-
ting doctrine to civil violations, an extension that the court was unwilling to 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. at 479. 
 101 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003) (“The showing that a law punishes a ‘sub-
stantial’ amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,’ 
suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial 
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected 
expression.’” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))). 
 102 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 480 (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969)). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. at 479–82. 
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make.106 Second, the court highlighted the fact that normally, “aiding and abet-
ting requires that a principal actually commit the underlying offense,” but 
“[t]here is no such requirement in [the Encouragement Restriction because] 
continuing to reside in the U.S. is not a criminal offense.”107 This is because, 
absent certain circumstances, residing in the United States without documenta-
tion is a civil violation. As a result, the court concluded that “assisting one to 
continue to reside here cannot be aiding and abetting a crime.”108 Third, and 
perhaps most convincing to the court, IRCA contains a specific provision that 
reaches anyone who “aids or abets the commission of any of the preceding 
acts.”109 Thus, the court was rather perplexed that the government would argue 
that the Encouragement Restriction should be upheld as an aiding and abetting 
statute when the statute itself contains a separate and explicit aiding and abet-
ting provision. 
Having settled upon the appropriate construction and concluding that the 
Encouragement Restriction neither prohibited speech designed to incite unlaw-
ful action nor speech integral to criminal conduct, the court discussed “whether 
the amount of protected speech the [Encouragement Restriction] restricts is 
substantial in relation to its legitimate sweep.”110 This inquiry requires a court 
to determine if there is “a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly 
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the 
Court.”111 On this point, the court was unequivocal: the potential reach of the 
Encouragement Restriction is absurdly broad and constitutionally unacceptable. 
To illustrate, the court, quoting an amicus brief, noted that the Encouragement 
Restriction would cover “‘a loving grandmother who urges her grandson to over 
stay his visa,’ by telling him ‘I encourage you to stay.’”112 The court also ex-
pressed concern that the statute might reach “marches, speeches, publications, 
and public debate expressing support for immigrants.”113 The court imagined a 
hypothetical speaker who says: 
I encourage all you folks out there without legal status to stay in the 
U.S.! We are in the process of trying to change the immigration laws, 
and the more we can show the potential hardship on people who have 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. at 482 (noting that the government “points to no case where a defendant was convicted 
for aiding and abetting a civil offense”). 
 107 Id. at 480 (emphasis added). 
 108 Id. 
 109 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). 
 110 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485. 
 111 Id. at 483 (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 780, 
801 (1984)). 
 112 See id. (quoting an anecdote articulated in a submitted amicus brief). 
 113 Id. at 484. 
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been in the country a long time, the better we can convince American 
citizens to fight for us and grant us a path to legalization . . . .114 
The court argued that even though such a speech would constitute neither in-
citement nor aiding or abetting, the plain language of the Encouragement Re-
striction would criminalize it. Such a conclusion would be unacceptable, as it 
would result in “[c]riminalizing . . . almost anyone willing to weigh in on the 
[immigration] debate.”115 This echoes the concern of the Henderson court, 
which noted that if “all the government needs to establish is that the defendant 
knowingly helped or advised the alien . . . the statute may be deployed to crim-
inalize any action, however modest, which may be construed to involve any 
help or advice, however innocent in itself, to illegal aliens.”116 
In this manner, the Sineneng-Smith court found the Encouragement Provi-
sion to be unconstitutionally overbroad.117 To support this decision, the court 
cited a number of imagined scenarios that the Encouragement Restriction 
would prohibit, including intimate conversations between family members118 
and political speech.119 Wary of indulging in the “fanciful hypotheticals” dis-
couraged by the Supreme Court,120 the Sineneng-Smith court stressed that these 
scenarios “are part of every-day discussions in this country where citizens live 
side-by-side with non-citizens.”121 The Sineneng-Smith court did not, however, 
discuss the Encouragement Restriction’s effect on a transactional lawyer’s ad-
vice to an undocumented entrepreneur on how to properly form and operate his 
or her business. For many transactional attorneys, this activity is just as im-
portant to highlight as family conversations and political speeches. 
II. UNDOCUMENTED ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
This Part discusses the driving forces behind undocumented entrepreneurs 
in the United States and the business structures available for such entrepre-
neurs and their companies. Section A discusses economic opportunity and 
choice for undocumented immigrants in the United States and outlines reasons 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (alterations omitted) (quoting Fujii, 301 F.3d at 540). 
 117 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 485. 
 118 See id. at 484–85 (discussing examples put forth in the amicus brief). 
 119 Id. at 484. 
 120 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301 (2008) (bemoaning the “tendency of our 
overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals”); Sineneng-Smith, 
910 F.3d at 483–85. 
 121 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 483. 
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they may choose to be entrepreneurs.122 Section B evaluates the business entity 
options available to these undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs.123 
A. The Modern Undocumented Immigrant Entrepreneur 
Immigrants represent an integral part of the U.S. economy.124 Given the 
long history of immigrant workers in the United States, this should be no sur-
prise.125 Although precise numbers are difficult to discern, most scholars esti-
mate that there are about 10.5 million undocumented immigrants currently living 
in the United States,126 the vast majority of whom are vital participants in our 
country’s economy.127 Of most interest to this Article, a disproportionate number 
of undocumented immigrants have proven to be quite entrepreneurial; eight to 
ten percent of business owners are estimated to be undocumented immigrants.128 
1. The Undocumented Entrepreneur 
At first blush, entrepreneurship might seem to be an unlikely option for 
many undocumented people. Most states do not allow undocumented immi-
grants to obtain driver’s licenses, leading one to think that a business license 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See infra notes 124–191 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 192–223 and accompanying text. 
 124 Krishna, supra note 7, at 208. 
 125 See PANEL ON THE ECON. & FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION, THE ECONOMIC AND 
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ful immigrant men (eighty-four percent) of similar age. 
Id. 
 128 Michael Mastman, Note, Undocumented Entrepreneurs: Are Business Owners “Employees” 
Under the Immigration Laws?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 225, 225 (2008) (citing Julia 
Boorstin, Illegal Entrepreneurs; Maria Has No U.S. Visa, and Jose’s Expires Soon. Yet They Own a 
Profitable California Factory, Pay Taxes, and Create Jobs., CNN MONEY (July 1, 2005), https://money.
cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2005/07/01/8265279/ [https://perma.cc/NX5F-5X5F-5QDQ]). 
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would be out of the question.129 Further, one might assume entrepreneurship to 
be impossible for many undocumented immigrants because successful entre-
preneurship requires a certain minimum level of resources and networks.130 A 
number of successful entrepreneurs embrace and champion failure,131 but eco-
nomic failure can only be absorbed by those with financial means.132 For this 
reason, entrepreneurship is not often a realistic option for many undocumented 
people because they do not have the resources required to take advantage of 
market opportunities.133 Two notable professors write: 
It is simply unreasonable to expect that those below the poverty line 
could survive the losses that invariably accompany entrepreneurial 
endeavors. At a certain level of poverty, the choice is between feed-
ing one’s family and nurturing a business investment, and it is un-
tenable to expect an entrepreneur to make a decision that results in a 
loss of food for her family.134 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Gilbert Mendoza & Chesterfield Polkey, States Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 25, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-
offering-driver-s-licenses-to-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NLR-RA6C] (“Thirteen states and 
the District of Columbia enacted laws to allow unauthorized immigrants to obtain . . . driver’s licenses.”). 
 130 Minda Zetlin, Do You Need a Wealthy Background to Be a Successful Entrepreneur?, INC. (July 
22, 2015), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/do-you-need-a-wealthy-background-to-be-a-successful-
entrepreneur.html [https://perma.cc/HYS4-XNC2]. Zetlin found: 
It costs an average $30,000 to start a company and the vast majority of start-up funding 
comes from personal assets and investments by family or friends. In addition to start-up 
costs, founders have to run their ventures for some time without drawing a salary. So 
it’s easy to see how having a substantial bank account, wealthy friends or relatives who 
are willing to bet on you, and maybe a family or spouse who’ll support you for a while 
makes starting a business much more feasible. 
Id. 
 131 See Eric Franklin Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism, 78 MD. L. REV. 1, 39 (2018). 
This article notes:  
In defending his embrace of failure, [Bill] Gates once noted, “Success is a lousy teach-
er. It seduces smart people into thinking they can’t lose.” . . . [David] Callahan quoted 
Bill Ackman, a hedge fund investor and philanthropist, as being so “comfortable with 
failure” that he admitted “there is some new mistake we haven’t yet made that we’ll 
make in the future. But as long as we learn from it, it’s fine.” 
Id. 
 132 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: A 
New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 843 (2014) (“[T]he 
best innovations of social entrepreneurs have been captured by individuals and groups above the pov-
erty line and often outside the inner city.”). 
 133 See id. at 844 (noting that, because of their general financial status, most undocumented peo-
ple are not “in a position to exploit the market in the way that entrepreneurship theory demands”). 
 134 Id. at 861. 
1344 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1323 
Given this reality, one might reasonably ask why so many undocumented peo-
ple decide to start their own businesses. Depressingly, it is because they have 
no better option. 
Unlike traditional entrepreneurs, who turn to entrepreneurship because 
they have identified an unexploited market opportunity,135 undocumented im-
migrants are driven to entrepreneurship because the alternatives are terribly 
unattractive.136 For this reason, undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs should 
be thought of as necessity entrepreneurs.137 A necessity entrepreneur is some-
one who starts a business because they lack alternative choices.138 This is in 
contrast to opportunity entrepreneurs, who make business choices based on 
their self-interested motivations.139 A necessity entrepreneur is one motivated 
by “survival,” while opportunity entrepreneurs are driven by “the dream of 
wealth,”140 a desire to not have a boss,141 or even simple boredom.142 Indeed, 
one might consider an undocumented immigrant entrepreneur to be the quin-
tessential necessity entrepreneur because, as the next Subsection will illustrate, 
the U.S. legal regime prohibits traditional employment for undocumented peo-
ple, leaving only poorly paid, unsafe, and undesirable opportunities.143 
2. The Shift from Migrant Workers to Immigrant Workers 
Although entrepreneurship may not represent “a viable basis for systemic 
poverty alleviation,”144 it is often the best option for undocumented immi-
                                                                                                                           
 135 See id. at 855. The article notes that the “entrepreneur’s important quality of ‘alertness to the 
existence of opportunities that have been overlooked,’ and ability to exploit such opportunities suffi-
ciently to provide new resources and wealth for herself and those whom she employed.” Id. (quoting 
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTRE-
PRENEURSHIP 110–11 (1979)). 
 136 See Eric Franklin Amarante, The Unsung Latino Entrepreneurs of Appalachia, 120 W. VA. L. 
REV. 773, 782–83 (2018). 
 137 PAUL D. REYNOLDS ET AL., GLOB. ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, 2001 EXECUTIVE REPORT 
4, at 8 (2001). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Scott A. Hipsher, Theoretical View on Microenterprise Entrepreneurial Motivators, in CON-
TEMPORARY MICROENTERPRISE: CONCEPTS AND CASES 49, 51 (Joseph Mark S. Munoz ed., 2010). 
 141 Jonathan Long, 60 Reasons Why Entrepreneurship Is Amazing, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/243389 [https://perma.cc/K3CU-SJZT]. 
 142 Jacob Serebrin, Facing Boredom and Limited Savings, Seniors Turn to Entrepreneurship, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/sb-
managing/seniors-turn-to-entrepreneurship-with-younger-partners/article32374241/ [https://perma.cc/
NY9A-EWQP]. 
 143 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 774–75; Frank M. Fossen & Tobias J.M. Büttner, The Re-
turns to Education for Opportunity Entrepreneurs, Necessity Entrepreneurs, and Paid Employees, 37 
ECON. EDUC. REV. 66, 70 (2013) (“[N]ecessity entrepreneurs would not be entrepreneurs if they had 
alternative employment options.”). 
 144 Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 132, at 844. 
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grants. The story of the undocumented entrepreneur cannot be told without a 
brief discussion of the evolution of immigration enforcement in the United 
States. More specifically, this Subsection will examine how migrant workers 
became immigrant workers. 
Not too long ago, many undocumented workers spent as little time in the 
United States as possible. Migrant workers, working primarily in agriculture, 
would enter the United States to perform seasonal work and return to their 
home country in the off-season.145 From the migrants’ perspective, the primary 
reason to come to the United States was to find work and few had any interest 
in more permanent residence.146 From the perspective of the United States, the 
agriculture industry required inexpensive labor.147 The solution was the Brac-
ero Program, a temporary guest worker program that provided temporary legal 
status for around 4.6 million Mexicans to meet the agricultural labor needs of 
the United States.148 Bracero workers would work during harvest season and 
spend the balance of the year in their home countries.149 
The recent debate concerning immigration makes it difficult to fathom 
that, historically, many migrants were not interested in permanent residence.150 
This is, however, certainly true.151 In a study describing the migration patterns 
of farmworkers from a rural Mexican town in the late 1970s, migrants held 
permanents homes in Mexico where they returned seasonally to rest in be-
tween busy agricultural periods in the United States.152 Indeed, this study noted 
that “90 percent of the legal migrants . . . returned from their last trip to the 
U.S. within 12 months of leaving . . . and most of these (71%) returned in nine 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Marielena Hincapié, Aqui Estamos y No Nos Vamos: Unintended Consequences of Current 
Immigration Law, in GLOBAL CONNECTIONS & LOCAL RECEPTIONS: NEW LATINO IMMIGRATION TO 
THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 89, 94, 103 (Fran Ansley & Jon Shefner eds., 2009); see Philip 
Martin, Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door, 36 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 
1124, 1127 (2002) (“The demand for hired workers in agriculture is seasonal—more workers are 
needed during some months of the year than others. . . . The migrant farm labor system depended on 
an army of workers willing to accommodate themselves to seasonality.”). 
 146 Josh Reichert & Douglas S. Massey, Patterns of U.S. Migration from a Mexican Sending Com-
munity: A Comparison of Legal and Illegal Migrants, 13 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 599, 600 (1979). 
 147 Martin, supra note 145, at 1127. 
 148 Id. at 1128. This program applied to workers from “North America, South America, and Cen-
tral America, and the islands adjacent thereto.” Id. 
 149 Id. at 1128–29. It is important to note that the Bracero Program was adopted over the strenu-
ous objection of labor activists. The labor advocates were drowned out by calls to provide “food to 
win the war” in light of World War II. Id. The hollowness of this justification was made bare when the 
end of the war failed to bring a cessation of migrant farmworkers crossing the border. Id. The Bracero 
Program was not without its critics, but advocates made them politically palatable by tying food pro-
duction to the U.S. efforts in World War II. Id. 
 150 See Reichert & Massey, supra note 146, at 606. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 600–01, 613. 
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months or less.”153 The study concluded that although a high number of mi-
grants make the trip to the United States for work, these migrants do not aspire 
to permanently move to the United States.154 In something of a prediction of 
future immigration policy, the report pointed out that the migrants who re-
turned to Mexico were those who were legally permitted to engage in the 
work, while those without permission (i.e., undocumented immigrants) were 
less likely to return to their homes in Mexico.155 These undocumented workers, 
representing a minority of the migrants, were more likely to spend as much 
time as possible in the United States.156 The authors attributed this to “the high 
risk of detection faced by [undocumented immigrants] while crossing the bor-
der” and emphasized the “clear incentive” to stay in the United States longer in 
order to “maximize earnings.”157 Thus, while certainly unintended, the enforce-
ment of immigration laws resulted in undocumented immigrants spending more 
time in the United States, a practice that increased in the ensuing decades. 
These unintended consequences were magnified by the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which made 
it much more difficult for migrants to cross the border at the beginning and end 
of each harvesting season.158 The intent of IIRIRA was to “curtail unlawful 
immigration” and punish employers who violated IRCA’s Employment Re-
strictions.159 IIRIRA, however, not only failed to meet the intended goal of 
curbing immigration, but it also resulted in a number of unintended conse-
quences.160 Undocumented immigrants were already incentivized to spend as 
much time as possible in the United States, but IIRIRA’s “bars to reentry” 
made that incentive much more powerful.161 These bars to reentry required 
undocumented immigrants to wait a period of time—in some instances up to 
ten years—before they were permitted to reenter the United States.162 This is 
true even if the person would otherwise be qualified to enter.163 These bars to 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Id. at 606. 
 154 Id. at 600. 
 155 Id. at 613. 
 156 Id.  
 157 See id. at 613–14 (“In this way, an [undocumented immigrant] can send or bring home more 
money, and thereby put off the time when he must risk another crossing into the United States.”). 
 158 See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 159 See Hincapié, supra note 145, at 100. 
 160 See generally id. (arguing that a holistic global perspective is required to properly understand 
and tackle the issue of immigration). 
 161 See IIRIRA § 301; see also Hincapié, supra note 145, at 103. 
 162 See IIRIRA § 301. 
 163 See id. If, for example, a person had a valid family or employment-based petition, IIRIRA’s 
bars would apply. Id.; see also Hincapié, supra note 145, at 103. IIRIRA imposes a three-year bar 
upon any person who leaves the United States after more than 180 days of unlawful residence and a 
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reentry are triggered when a person leaves the United States and tries to reenter, 
and therefore IIRIRA serves as a strong incentive for many undocumented peo-
ple to simply remain in the United States.164 One scholar observes, “[b]ecause 
workers without papers find it more and more difficult to maintain their tradi-
tional commuting pattern across the border, they opt to bring their families and 
settle them permanently on the U.S. side.”165 Another scholar notes that this 
phenomenon is further explained by the rationale underlying the decision of 
many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States by saying: 
[A]n immigrant can avoid being subject to [IIRIRA’s bars to reentry] 
if she never leaves the United States. Undocumented immigrants 
who dream of eventual citizenship or lawful permanent residence 
and who receive well-informed advice, soon learn that departing 
from the United States will quite likely delay or destroy their chanc-
es of achieving lawful status. In essence, the penalties created by 
IIRIRA have had the unintended consequence of locking in many 
undocumented people who do not want to risk triggering the bars.166 
In sum, after decades of encouraging both lawful and unlawful migration for 
agricultural labor, the United States passed a series of laws that resulted in 
criminalizing the employment of undocumented people, disrupted the tradi-
tional migration patterns that permitted an immigrant to move back and forth 
between Mexico and the United States, and incentivized undocumented people 
to establish more permanent lives in the United States.167 As the next Subsec-
tion explains, once these former migrants were effectively trapped in the Unit-
ed States as immigrants, it became clear that continued work in agriculture was 
not a viable long-term profession. 
                                                                                                                           
ten-year bar for any person who unlawfully resides in the United States for over a year. Any violation 
of these bars results in a permanent bar. See IIRIRA § 240A. 
 164 See IIRIRA § 240A. 
 165 Alejandro Portes, The New Latin Nation: Immigration and the Hispanic Population of the United 
States, in A COMPANION TO LATINA/O STUDIES 15, 18 (Juan Flores & Renato Rosaldo eds., 2009). 
 166 Hincapié, supra note 145, at 103–04. 
 167 Although this Subsection argues that there are numerous reasons for an undocumented immi-
grant to avoid crossing the border, a significant number of workers continues to repeatedly cross the 
border to follow seasonal work. As a recent study notes, “large numbers [of undocumented immi-
grants] also move both ways across the U.S.-Mexico border throughout the year, sometimes staying 
for only a few months . . . .” Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Mexican Immigrants: How Many 
Come? How Many Leave?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 22, 2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/
2009/07/22/mexican-immigrants-how-many-come-how-many-leave/ [https://perma.cc/F5PX-RYGJ]. 
The study also observes that “Mexican-U.S. migration also tends to be seasonal, with larger north-
bound flows in the spring and summer and larger southbound flows in the fall and winter.” Id. 
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3. From Agriculture to Food Processing to Business Ownership 
Although the promise of agricultural work drew most undocumented im-
migrants to the United States,168 many immigrants do not view farm labor as a 
permanent or long-term option for a number of reasons.169 First of all, farm 
work is physically demanding. As described by a migrant farmworker, 
“[a]griculture is very heavy work . . . [; w]e toil from sunrise until our bodies 
can’t take any more.”170 The punishing nature of agricultural work might be 
best explained by the attrition rate of U.S. citizens who try their hand at farm 
work.171 According to one study, of the 143 U.S. citizens who started working 
in the fields during the 2012 harvest season in North Carolina, only ten com-
pleted the season.172 This rate of attrition—approximately 93%—is even more 
alarming when one considers the relatively high unemployment rate of 9.52% 
at the time.173 Further, that year was not an anomaly. In 2011, when the unem-
ployment rate was even higher at 10.51%, only seven of 163 U.S. citizens 
completed the season, resulting in an attrition rate of 95.7%.174 For these rea-
sons, at least one farm owner openly preferred immigrant workers, saying that 
he considers U.S. citizens “the labor pool of last resort.”175 
Perhaps the physically demanding work would be sufferable if the pay 
were commensurate with the difficulty of the labor. Unfortunately, farm work 
is notoriously poorly remunerated.176 Labor rights activist César Chávez fa-
mously described farm workers as, 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Martin, supra note 145, at 1139 (noting that “rural Mexicans often begin their American 
journey in U.S. fields and farm-related industries such as meat and poultry processing”). 
 169 See id. at 1133 (“Most of the [workers authorized under IRCA’s Special Agriculture Worker 
program] who were in their twenties in the late 1980s have moved out of farm work . . . .”). 
 170 Brian Barth, The High Cost of Cheap Labor, MOD. FARMER (Feb. 21, 2017), https://modern
farmer.com/2017/02/migrant-farm-workers-the-high-cost-of-cheap-labor/ [https://perma.cc/VX3E-
DLWB]. 
 171 MICHAEL A. CLEMENS, P’SHIP FOR A NEW AM. ECON. & CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., INTERNA-
TIONAL HARVEST: A CASE STUDY OF HOW FOREIGN WORKERS HELP AMERICAN FARMS GROW 
CROPS—AND THE ECONOMY 4–7 (2013), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/international-
harvest.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DCQ-NJ59]. 
 172 Id. at 10. 
 173 Id.  
 174 Id. 
 175 Barth, supra note 170. The reasons farmers prefer immigrant labor are as predictable as they 
are hilarious. As one farmer said, “The one kid couldn’t stop texting while he was on the plow. The 
other kid was just dense. How many times can you turn to someone and say, ‘You know, you missed 
fruit on that plant?’ A bunch of stuff rotted in the field.” Id. (quoting a farmer from Valatie, New 
York). 
 176 See STEVE CLAPP, FIXING THE FOOD SYSTEM: CHANGING HOW WE PRODUCE AND CONSUME 
FOOD 142 (2017) (“Farmworkers still have the lowest annual family incomes of any U.S. wage and 
salary workers . . . .”). 
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involved in the planting and the cultivation and the harvesting of the 
greatest abundance of food known in this society. They bring in so 
much food to feed you and me and the whole country and enough 
food to export to other places. The ironic thing and the tragic thing 
is that after they make this tremendous contribution, they don’t have 
any money or any food left for themselves.177 
This bitter irony—that those who pick our fruits and vegetables cannot afford 
to buy sufficient food—is compounded by the seasonal nature of most agricul-
tural work.178 Once harvest time has passed, the work in the fields dries up. 
Thus, not only does the work not pay well, but the work is intermittent. Of 
course, this seasonality was once a positive aspect of migrant farm work be-
cause it allowed migrant workers to return to their home countries during the 
off-season. Once IIRIRA established the reentry bars, however, immigrants 
who were virtually trapped in the United States began to seek more consistent, 
year-round work. 
Without proper documentation, job opportunities outside of agriculture 
for immigrants are extremely limited. More often than not, the only available 
alternatives for undocumented immigrants are slaughterhouses, poultry plants, 
and various meat processing facilities.179 Although these jobs provide more 
consistent work, there is a reason these jobs are available: working in food 
processing plants is notoriously difficult,180 dangerous,181 and unpleasant.182 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Speech at Convention of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, Los Angeles, June 1974, in THE WORDS OF CÉSAR CHÁVEZ 79, 86–
87 (Richard J. Jensen & John C. Hammerback eds., 2002) [hereinafter Speech at Convention of Inter-
national Union]. 
 178 See CLAPP, supra note 176, at 142 (“Farm work is seasonal, strenuous, and dangerous . . . .”); 
see also Speech at Convention of International Union, supra note 177, at 86–87. 
 179 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 775, 781. 
 180 See Peggy Lowe, Working ‘The Chain,’ Slaughterhouse Workers Face Lifelong Injuries, NPR 
(Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/11/489468205/working-the-chain-
slaughterhouse-workers-face-lifelong-injuries [https://perma.cc/AMM5-QDS8] (describing “punish-
ing rates of production” resulting in “a lifetime of pain and physical problems”); see also Amarante, 
supra note 136, at 782 (stating that “[t]o make matters worse, workers in meat processing plants are 
routinely overworked and mistreated with reports of not only dangerous conditions, but also insuffi-
cient bathroom breaks that require workers to wear adult diapers”). 
 181 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-337, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: 
ADDITIONAL DATA NEEDED TO ADDRESS CONTINUED HAZARDS IN THE MEAT AND POULTRY IN-
DUSTRY 21 (2016) (noting that employees in meat processing plants “fac[e] hazardous work condi-
tions . . . including hazards associated with musculoskeletal disorders, chemical hazards, biological 
hazards from pathogens and animals, and traumatic injury hazards from machines and tools”); Mi-
chael Grabell, Exploitation and Abuse at the Chicken Plant, NEW YORKER (May 1, 2017), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/exploitation-and-abuse-at-the-chicken-plant [https://perma.cc/
9Q86-N3G3]. 
 182 See Tess Owen, Chicken Industry Workers Wear Diapers Because Bosses Allow No Breaks, 
NGO Says, VICE (May 11, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59ea3x/chicken-industry-
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Further, similar to most jobs available to undocumented immigrants, food pro-
cessing plant positions pay extraordinarily low wages.183 Needless to say, in 
addition to these negatives, there is virtually no promise of advancement in 
these jobs.184 
Thus, without authorization to work in the United States, the only choice 
presented to many undocumented immigrants is either the intermittent and 
poorly paid work on farms or the disgusting and dangerous work in food pro-
cessing plants. It should therefore be no surprise that many immigrants look 
for other opportunities to support their families. 
Faced with the choice of work on the farm or in the factory, and virtually 
prohibited from leaving the United States without forgoing future opportunities 
within the country due to IIRIRA, it is little wonder that many undocumented 
immigrants turn to entrepreneurship. Despite the fact that the entrepreneurship 
of many undocumented immigrants is far from glamorous, often consisting of 
domestic work or landscaping, “the preponderance of research in the area sug-
gests that, even in its less attractive forms, self-employment offers immigrants 
better outcomes than other available options” and such entrepreneurs fare bet-
ter economically.185 
Given the improved economic prospects, undocumented entrepreneurship 
certainly provides a benefit for the individual entrepreneur and the entrepre-
neur’s family. Compared to work in agriculture or food processing plants, 
business ownership provides more security, more safety, and markedly better 
financial prospects. But the benefits are not limited to the entrepreneur and his 
or her family; undocumented entrepreneurship has the potential to provide an 
                                                                                                                           
workers-wear-diapers-because-bosses-allow-no-breaks-ngo-says [https://perma.cc/WBB5-TZAD] 
(noting that a particular chicken plant “smells like a combination of chicken blood and bleach”); see 
also Grabell, supra note 181. 
 183 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 785; see also Grabell, supra note 181 (noting that some 
workers tasked with rounding up chickens “are paid around $2.25 for every thousand chickens[, and 
that t]wo crews of nine catchers can bring in about seventy-five thousand chickens a night,” coming to 
$168.75 an evening, presumably shared amongst nine workers).  
 184 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 785. Specifically,  
the jobs available to most immigrants do not provide much hope of economic advance-
ment, which might convince immigrant workers to consider entrepreneurship. This is 
known as the blocked mobility theory, and studies show that “barriers in traditional labor 
markets and low human capital acquisition tend to be the driving forces behind the growth 
of self-employment activity among Latinos, especially the foreign-born.” 
Id. (quoting Bárbara J. Robles & Héctor Cordero-Guzmán, Latino Self Employment and Entrepre-
neurship in the United States: An Overview of the Literature and Data Sources, 613 ANNALS. AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18, 21 (2007)). 
 185 Stephanie A. Bohon et al., Mexican Self-Employment in Old and New Latino Places, in 
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS & LOCAL RECEPTIONS: NEW LATINO IMMIGRATION TO THE SOUTHEASTERN 
UNITED STATES, supra note 145, at 199, 200. 
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economic boon throughout the national economy.186 Immigrant participation in 
the workplace serves to bolster sorely needed revenue for the federal govern-
ment,187 including tens of billions of dollars for the Social Security trust 
fund.188 Additionally, there is significant evidence that immigrant participation 
in the workplace helps on a local scale, with one report estimating that undoc-
umented immigrants pay $11.64 billion a year towards state and local taxes.189 
This influx of revenue is particularly vital for small towns, where immigrant-
owned businesses have helped revitalize otherwise abandoned strip malls and 
commercial districts throughout the United States.190 Helping the economies of 
small towns not only keeps money circulating within the community, but it 
also provides local government with additional revenues through sales taxes, 
payroll taxes, and property taxes.191 In this manner, immigrant entrepreneur-
ship helps improve both the lives of the individual business owners, as well as 
the local, state, and national economies. 
B. Business Forms 
It is difficult to ascertain the preferred legal entity for undocumented entre-
preneurs. As private entities, states impose limited disclosure requirements, and 
tax information is not public. We might, however, make some educated assump-
tions about the preferred business entity choice of undocumented entrepreneurs. 
For example, it is likely that many undocumented entrepreneurs, like most en-
trepreneurs, decide against a formal legal entity and simply operate their busi-
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. 
 187 See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump Says Undocumented Immigrants Are an Economic Bur-
den. They Pay Billions in Taxes., VOX (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/13/17229018/
undocumented-immigrants-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/Y4N-R5CS]. Campbell writes: 
The most recent IRS data, from 2015, shows that the agency received 4.4 million in-
come tax returns from workers who don’t have Social Security numbers, which in-
cludes a large number of undocumented immigrants. That year, they paid $23.6 billion 
in income taxes. That doesn’t even include workers who paid taxes with fake Social 
Security numbers on their W-2 forms, which is also common. 
Id. 
 188 See id. (quoting Stephen Goss, chief actuary of the Social Security Administration, who said, 
“[w]e estimate that earnings by unauthorized immigrants result in a net positive effect on Social Secu-
rity financial status generally”); see also Krishna, supra note 7, at 210 (stating that “[t]he Social Secu-
rity Administration reported in 2013 that undocumented immigrants worked and contributed as much 
as thirteen billion dollars in payroll taxes (including employers’ contributions) to the Social Security 
trust fund in 2010”). 
 189 LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE ET AL., INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS’ STATE & LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS 1–2 (2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/
immigration2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J53L-YP99]. 
 190 See Amarante, supra note 136, at 774–75. 
 191 Id. 
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nesses as sole proprietorships.192 This is because sole proprietorships demand 
few legal formalities, have no filing requirements for formation, and are often 
the least expensive option for entrepreneurs.193 Further, given that many undoc-
umented immigrants may lack access to legal advice, they are likely to start op-
erating their business without legal formalities, which would normally result in 
the operation being treated as a sole proprietorship.194 But if an undocumented 
entrepreneur were to receive legal advice, it is unlikely that the business would 
remain a sole proprietorship. This is because any business that carries a modi-
cum of potential liability would lead a rational entrepreneur to regard the liabil-
ity protections of most legal entity forms with favor.195 Due to restrictions 
against employment of undocumented people, discussed in more detail below, 
many undocumented entrepreneurs opt to form either a cooperative or an LLC. 
1. Worker Cooperatives 
A worker cooperative is an ancient legal entity196 that has grown in favor 
of late.197 In short, worker cooperatives are “firms that are democratically 
owned and managed by their workers.”198 As succinctly described by one 
scholar, “a worker cooperative adheres to fundamental principles, such as vol-
untary and nondiscriminatory membership, democratic member control, equi-
table economic participation by members, and a commitment to ongoing 
member education.”199 These appealing characteristics have made worker co-
operatives the entity of choice for many activists agitating to increase local 
ownership and control of businesses. 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See Choose a Business Structure, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/business-
guide/launch-your-business/choose-business-structure [https://perma.cc/Y83U-EP4H] (“Sole proprie-
torships can be a good choice for low-risk businesses and owners who want to test their business idea 
before forming a more formal business.”). 
 193 Michael F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited Liability Sole Pro-
prietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381, 387. 
 194 See generally Justice Index 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., https://justiceindex.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4476-MB2E] (providing data and information online regarding access to justice 
programs available throughout the country). 
 195 See Crusto, supra note 193, at 383 (“Shielding a shareholder’s personal assets from business 
liability is a quintessential element of corporate law.”). 
 196 See Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin, Work in America and the Cooperative Movement, in 
WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 3, 3 (Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin eds., 1984) (“Since 
colonial times there has been a continuous history of worker cooperatives in the United States.”). 
 197 Eillie Anzilotti, More U.S. Businesses Are Becoming Worker Co-ops: Here’s Why, FAST COM-
PANY (May 21, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40572926/more-u-s-businesses-are-becoming-
worker-co-ops-heres-why [https://perma.cc/K9EZ-X95V]. 
 198 Jackall & Levin, supra note 196, at 3. 
 199 See Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for Low-Income 
Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 185–86 (1999). 
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Worker cooperatives have also proven to be quite popular for undocu-
mented entrepreneurs.200 This is likely due to the fact that the worker coopera-
tive entity boasts a number of inherent advantages that might be appealing to 
an undocumented worker. First of all, worker cooperatives provide democratic 
control over a workplace. Like many workers, undocumented workers are like-
ly to be attracted to this governance structure. Indeed, undocumented workers 
might know more intimately the advantages of worker control, given that 
many of them were exploited by previous employers.201 A democratically con-
trolled business is also attractive for workers of all stripes, as lay-offs or cuts in 
wages are often driven by investors or management interested in increasing 
profit margins. Worker cooperatives are less likely to experience such lay-offs 
or cuts in wages because there are no outside investors and management is 
conducted by the workers themselves.202 Thus, after covering the cost of op-
erations and salaries, there is little concern for how much profit a particular 
endeavor makes. A worker cooperative additionally provides the potential up-
side of business ownership to laborers who have traditionally not been given 
such an opportunity.203 Further, because the workers are also tasked with run-
ning the business, there is an invaluable education component of being a mem-
ber of a worker cooperative.204 Workers are often forced to learn “business-
related skills such as accounting, marketing, management, and literacy,” which 
are not often provided to laborers.205 Finally, a worker cooperative might also 
protect formerly vulnerable workers from exploitation by providing greater 
negotiating power. If a dishonest person owes money to an individual undoc-
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Krishna, supra note 7, at 216 (“[Democracy at Work Institute’s] mission is to ‘expand the 
worker cooperative model to reach communities most directly affected by social and economic ine-
quality, specifically people of color, recent immigrants, and low-wage workforces.’”); see also Cum-
mings, supra note 199, at 191–92 (discussing Las Domésticas, a cooperative of domestic workers); 
Mastman, supra note 128, at 241 (discussing the CleanHome cooperative). 
 201 See Cummings, supra note 199, at 187 (“Workers exercise final decision-making authority 
over the way the work is organized, performed, and managed. They are given a stake in the business, 
and must work collaboratively in order to achieve success.”). 
 202 Id. Cummings further notes:  
The formation of a cooperative business can also increase job security for workers who 
would otherwise be subject to market exploitation based on their vulnerable economic 
position. The collective nature of the cooperative enterprise provides mechanisms that 
foster this security. For example, the workers can provide each other mutual support in 
finding and maintaining stable jobs for all cooperative members. 
Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See id. (“By bearing the responsibility of running a business, the workers commit themselves 
to a continuing process of self-education . . . . In fact, many cooperatives are formed primarily to facil-
itate job training, and seek to attract seed money from foundations and government agencies to pro-
mote this mission.”). 
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umented person, they may threaten to report the person to immigration authori-
ties as a way to avoid payment. This danger is lessoned in a worker coopera-
tive, because the debtor “may be less inclined to withhold payment from a 
business entity with the power to resort to legal action to enforce its rights.”206 
An example of a successful and much celebrated worker cooperative is Sí 
Se Puede, a Brooklyn-based company that provides cleaning services.207 
Formed in 2006, Sí Se Puede is a women-owned worker cooperative where all 
members are immigrants.208 The organization is “designed to create living 
wage jobs that will be done in a safe and healthy environment.”209 One mem-
ber of Sí Se Puede reported that after joining the cooperative, her hourly rate 
rose from $6.25 an hour to $25 an hour.210 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See id. (discussing “the formality of the cooperative business”). In addition, although beyond 
the scope of this Article, cooperatives present the opportunity to take advantage of certain preferential 
tax treatment. Briefly, cooperatives may deduct patronage dividends (amounts distributed to coopera-
tive members on the basis of their work with the cooperative). See I.R.C. subtitle A, chapter 1, sub-
chapter T (2018) (discussing the tax treatment of cooperatives and their patrons). 
 207 About Us, SI SE PUEDE! WOMEN’S COOPERATIVE, https://wecandoit.coop/about/ [https://
perma.cc/8A5Y-VKNU]. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See id. (describing the organization as designed “to provide social support and educational 
opportunities for our members”). 
 210 Laura Flanders, How America’s Largest Worker Owned Co-Op Lifts People Out of Poverty, 
YES! MAG. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/poverty/2014/08/15/how-america-s-
largest-worker-owned-co-op-lifts-people-out-of-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/HR5H-6A6k]. For a $40 
monthly dues payment, workers receive 100% of the cleaning fees. Although the positives of worker 
cooperatives are numerous and the popularity of cooperatives is growing, there are some potential 
negative aspects of worker cooperatives as well. One can easily imagine how the democratic govern-
ance structure of worker cooperatives, although empowering for individual workers, might prove to be 
inefficient and challenging. See Cummings, supra note 199, at 188 (“A cooperative’s democratic 
decision-making structure, while promoting collective action, may hamstring effective business man-
agement by hindering the cooperative’s ability to respond swiftly to market opportunities. . . . [T]here 
is a potential for intra-organizational disputes[,] . . . requir[ing] a greater investment of resources to 
mediate member conflict, which also could reduce economic efficiency.”); see also Alana Semuels, 
Getting Rid of Bosses, THE ATLANTIC (July 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/07/no-bosses-worker-owned-cooperatives/397007/ [https://perma.cc/T8ZZ-EMDD] (describing 
Black Star Co-op, a worker cooperative in Austin, Texas) (“[The Co-op] has been trying for some 
time to build a cover on its patio . . . . At some businesses, a $30,000 patio cover might be able to be 
approved by a CEO and built within months. At Black Star, it has taken years. There were detailed 
purchase proposals and meetings, and the vote had to be unanimous among the 20-member worker 
assembly.”). Additionally, worker cooperatives organized with the help of service providers may find it 
difficult to sustain success once the support structure is removed. Finally, if a worker cooperative is dedi-
cated to supporting an educational mission, there is a potential burden of training less-skilled members 
and an organization must practice patience with such members. See generally Cummings, supra note 
199, at 187–88 (highlighting some of the challenges (as well as benefits) that may accompany a coopera-
tive business structure). Discussing the pros and cons of cooperatives, Cummings notes that: 
A significant drawback of the cooperative form is the potential for conflict between its 
job training and job creation missions. In particular, lower-skilled, less efficient work-
ers—while gaining skills through their participation in the cooperative—are often una-
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2. Limited Liability Companies 
Unlike the worker cooperative, which claims a heritage that predates the 
founding of the country,211 the LLC is a relatively new legal entity. It was in-
vented in 1977 in Wyoming by a group of accountants and lawyers seeking to 
create an entity that incorporated the most attractive aspects of partnerships 
(e.g., pass-through taxation and flexible governance)212 and corporations (e.g., 
the limited liability protections).213 Once the tax treatment of this new form 
was clarified by the Internal Revenue Service in 1997, the LLC quickly be-
came the most popular legal entity for new businesses.214 Of the numerous ad-
vantages of the LLC, it appears that flexibility is its primary attraction. Alt-
hough the pass-through treatment is certainly an advantage, similar treatment 
is available to owners of S-Corps.215 An S-Corp, however, may not have more 
than one hundred shareholders, more than one class of stock, shareholders oth-
er than natural persons (or certain permitted entities),216 or any non-resident 
alien shareholders.217 In contrast, an LLC may enjoy the pass-through taxation 
of a partnership without any such ownership restrictions.218 Further, this flexi-
bility extends to many aspects of the LLC, including the manner in which an 
organization is governed219 and the way members of the LLC are paid.220 Giv-
                                                                                                                           
ble to generate their share of business clients or participate on an equal footing with 
other members of the group. This can create resentment in the higher-skilled members, 
causing intra-group conflict. If low-skilled members continue to act as a drain on coop-
erative resources, they may jeopardize the economic viability of the group, and, in seri-
ous cases, precipitate the dissolution of the business. 
Id. at 188. 
 211 Jackall & Levin, supra note 196, at 3. 
 212 Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 573, 
586 (2016). 
 213 See Daniel M. Häusermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to State Variation in 
Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2011) (noting that the LLC 
was “designed to be popular” for entrepreneurs). 
 214 Franklin, supra note 212, at 586. 
 215 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018). If an owner of a corporation were interested in the pass-through 
taxation enjoyed by partnerships, they might opt to be treated as a “small business corporation” by 
making an S-election. See id. 
 216 Certain trusts and tax-exempt organizations are permitted to be shareholders. See id. 
§ 1361(c)(6). 
 217 Id. § 1361(b). 
 218 Id. 
 219 An LLC can, for example, opt to be managed by its members, an individual member, or an 
outside manager. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 24(a) (2020). The statute states: 
Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, the management of a limited liabil-
ity company shall be vested in its members. An operating agreement may provide for the 
management, in whole or in part, of a limited liability company by one or more managers, 
who shall hold office and have the duties set forth in the operating agreement. 
 
1356 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1323 
en the popularity of LLCs among entrepreneurs and the fact that pass-through 
taxation is available regardless of immigration status, it should be no surprise 
that many undocumented entrepreneurs are also attracted to the LLC form.221 
Although there is no comprehensive study of undocumented immigrants who 
have formed LLCs, there are reports of immigrants operating graphic design 
businesses and political consultancies as LLCs.222 Indeed, the practice has be-
come commonplace enough to support a private industry for helping undocu-
mented immigrants form LLCs.223 
III. ENTREPRENEURSHIP OR ILLEGALLY EMPLOYING ONESELF? 
Increasing numbers of undocumented entrepreneurs forming businesses 
as worker cooperatives and LLCs have led to increased financial stability and 
more pleasant employment for undocumented people. The story of undocu-
mented business ownership, however, is not as simple as the previous Section 
suggests, and there is a significant question as to the legality of an undocu-
mented person owning a business. Or more precisely, given that the federal law 
prohibits the employment of undocumented people, an undocumented owner 
of a business might be violating federal law if the owner is deemed to be an 
employee of the business.224 As absurd as it sounds, an owner of a business 
would be guilty of employing an undocumented immigrant because the owner 
is employing him- or herself. Thus, the distinction between employment and 
ownership is of vital importance. 
                                                                                                                           
Id. 
 220 An LLC may give preference to individual members or classes of members in terms of distri-
butions. Id. § 29(a) (“The profits and losses of a limited liability company shall be allocated among 
the members, and among classes or groups of members, in the manner provided in the operating 
agreement.”). 
 221 See Carcamo, supra note 5 (“It’s unclear how many entrepreneurs [form LLCs]. Immigration 
experts say anecdotal evidence suggests interest in such businesses has grown in recent years as more 
states have adopted tougher illegal-immigration laws. But research is scant.”). 
 222 Id. Anecdotally, this Article’s author has helped two undocumented immigrants open political 
consulting businesses to help politicians reach out to Latino voters. 
 223 See, e.g., Robert Acevedo, Can an Illegal Immigrant Open an LLC Business?, FREEDOMTAX 
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.itinnumberonline.com/can-an-illegal-immigrant-open-an-llc-
businesse/ [https://perma.cc/63V8-WPM4]. The extraordinary flexibility of LLCs has resulted in an 
additional, and certainly unintended, consequence: LLCs may be structured to look very similar to 
cooperatives. See id. Because an organizer of an LLC has a virtually unfettered ability to dictate the 
structure of an LLC, there is nothing to stop an organizer from adopting the cooperative practice of, 
for example, democratic governance or equal economic treatment of members. See Cummings, supra 
note 199, at 205 (“The governing legal document of an LLC, the operating agreement, can be easily 
adapted to include cooperative principles.”). 
 224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2018) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to 
recruit . . . for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized 
alien . . . .”). 
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Section A of this Part reviews the legislative history of denying undocu-
mented immigrants the right to work in the United States.225 Section B of this 
Part discusses when an undocumented immigrant business owner is also an 
employee in violation of the IRCA.226 
A. The Legislative History of the Employment Restriction 
The prohibition on employing undocumented immigrants, although wide-
ly known, is a fairly recent restriction. As pointed out by one professor, “[f]or a 
century before 1986, federal law permitted employers to hire undocumented 
immigrants.”227 The legislative history of immigration statutes illustrates how 
modern immigration law evolved to focus on the activities of employers.228 In 
contrast, early statutes criminalized those who were luring immigrants into the 
country with the promise of employment. For example, the Immigration Act of 
1917 made it unlawful to “induce, assist, encourage, or solicit . . . any alien to 
come into the United States by promise of employment through advertise-
ments.”229 It is notable that this statute focused on the unlawful entry of immi-
grants, and did not specifically address employment of undocumented immi-
grants who might already reside in the United States.230 Following this theme, 
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (the “1952 Act”) established fines 
and imprisonment for anyone found guilty of “willfully or knowingly encour-
ag[ing] or induc[ing], or attempt[ing] to encourage or induce, either directly or 
indirectly, the entry into the United States” of undocumented people.231 The 
1952 Act also focused on the entry of undocumented immigrants, but farm 
owners expressed concerns that the “encourages or induces” language would 
cover agricultural hiring. Although the 1952 Act did not explicitly prohibit the 
employment of undocumented people that already resided in the United States, 
it is not unreasonable to conclude that paying someone for work might consti-
tute unlawful encouragement or inducement. Recognizing the potential eco-
nomic devastation that would befall the agricultural industry if employers were 
unable to take advantage of inexpensive undocumented labor, a group of Texas 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See infra notes 227–244 and accompanying text. 
 226 See infra notes 245–293 and accompanying text. 
 227 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experi-
ment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193. 
 228 See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 879–80 (1917). 
 229 Id. 
 230 This may have been due to the fact that early twentieth century migration patterns for farm-
workers involved returning to Mexico at the end of each harvesting season. See supra notes 145–157 
and accompanying text. 
 231 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163, 228 (1952). 
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legislators “muscled something called the ‘Texas Proviso’ into law.”232 The 
Texas Proviso made it clear that employment of undocumented people did not 
constitute encouragement or inducement and therefore was not prohibited by 
the 1952 Act. The practical result was that employers of undocumented people 
were told: “Forget the law. You’ll still get your cheap labor.”233 
Needless to say, the 1952 Act did not quell concerns over unlawful immi-
gration. Because the Texas Proviso was focused on protecting employers, the 
primary motivation for undocumented immigrants to enter the United States 
(i.e., jobs) remained in place. Thus, undocumented immigrants continued to 
cross into the United States to work, and policymakers concluded that any 
statute that ignored the employers would not be effective in curbing immigra-
tion. In this spirit, a few decades after the 1952 Act, the 92nd Congress pro-
duced a series of bills that specifically criminalized the employment of undoc-
umented immigrants.234 In its report, the House Judiciary Committee stated: 
[T]he primary reason for the illegal alien problem is the economic 
imbalance between the United States and the countries from which 
aliens come, coupled with the chance of employment in the United 
States. Consequently, it is apparent that this problem cannot be 
solved as long as jobs can be obtained by those who enter this coun-
try illegally . . . .235 
Following this logic, the House of Representatives passed several bills to pe-
nalize the employment of undocumented immigrants. Despite efforts during 
the Nixon and Ford administrations, none of these bills were able to pass in the 
Senate.236 Undaunted by the failures of his predecessors, President Carter also 
proposed restrictions on the employment of undocumented people.237 His ef-
forts also failed.238 These repeated failures left the 1952 Act and the Texas 
Proviso intact for over three decades, imposing no consequences on employers 
who hired undocumented people. 
This hypocrisy was finally put to rest in 1986 with the passage of IRCA, 
which addressed the primary shortcoming of previous laws by specifically 
prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring undocumented workers.239 Vio-
                                                                                                                           
 232 Freedom Day, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1986), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1986/10/19/138286.html?pageNumber=231 [https://perma.cc/8R6D-LGJW]. 
 233 Id.  
 234 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 57 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id.  
 237 Id. at 53. 
 238 Id. 
 239 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1). 
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lations of this prohibition would result in fines, asset forfeiture, and even ar-
rests of employers.240 
Although the passage of IRCA addressed the hypocrisy of the Texas Pro-
viso, it presented undocumented workers with a difficult choice: if the only 
way to provide food and shelter for your family is to secure work in the United 
States, you can either (i) forge or purchase fake documentation,241 or (ii) accept 
a job with an unscrupulous employer willing to violate IRCA.242 Such employ-
ers were often motivated to hire undocumented immigrants under the assump-
tion that undocumented workers are unlikely to defend their rights in court.243 
As noted above, some entrepreneurial undocumented immigrants have rejected 
these choices and opted to start their own business. Yet, under certain circum-
stances, IRCA’s prohibition against employment of undocumented people 
might reach undocumented business owners, as the law sometimes considers 
business owners to be employees.244 Thus, even as a business owner, an un-
documented entrepreneur might violate IRCA. 
B. When Is a Business Owner an Employee? 
Because IRCA was specifically drafted to target the employment of un-
documented immigrants, it is not surprising that it does not address business 
ownership by undocumented immigrants.245 The relevant language of IRCA 
makes it “unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer 
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an 
unauthorized alien.”246 The statute does not address business ownership and 
defines neither “hire” nor “employment.”247 This silence is not the final word, 
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. 
 241 See CHACÓN & DAVIS, supra note 35, at 165 (“According to the New York Times, since the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 set penalties for employers who knowingly hire undoc-
umented immigrants, most have been forced to buy fake Social Security cards to obtain work.”). 
 242 Travis Putnam Hill, Big Employers No Strangers to Benefits of Cheap, Illegal Labor, TEX. TRIB. 
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/12/19/big-name-businesses-exploit-immigrant-labor/ 
[https://perma.cc/RY7G-4ZKE]. 
 243 See id. (“Employment rights apply equally to all workers, regardless of their immigration 
status . . . . The problem is most undocumented workers don’t know that, and employers may not 
know that. If they do know that, they will nevertheless use those workers’ vulnerable immigration 
status to discourage them from enforcing their rights.” (quoting Bill Beardall, executive director of the 
Equal Justice Center)). 
 244 See, e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Pub. L. No. 101-335, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.). 
 245 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
 246 Id. 
 247 See id. (providing definitions for other terms in the statute such as “unauthorized alien”). 
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however, because courts have construed a number of statutes in a manner that 
treats an owner of a business as an employee of the business. 
This question—precisely who is an “employee”—is one that “has chal-
lenged scholars, jurists, and practitioners since the dawn of labor law.”248 As 
with most legal puzzles, this issue’s genesis lies in imprecise drafting as many 
statutes fail to provide adequate definitions. Further complicating matters is the 
fact that a litany of benefits and protections—including, for example, mini-
mum wage laws, antidiscrimination protections, and Social Security retirement 
benefits—hinges on the existence of an employment relationship.249 With such 
high stakes, it is no wonder that this question is often intensely litigated. 
1. The Common Law Test 
Although intuition might suggest that an owner of a business cannot sim-
ultaneously be deemed an employee, this is a relatively common conclusion 
for many courts. For example, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. 
Wells, the Supreme Court held in 2003 that the owners of a medical practice 
may be treated as employees when determining whether the business was cov-
ered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).250 The ADA only applies 
to entities with fifteen or more employees and it is common for doctors in 
medical practices to be partners in the entity, as opposed to employees.251 The 
question before the Clackamas Court was whether a medical partnership with 
more than fifteen doctors (i.e., owners of a partnership) is subject to the 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 106 (2018). 
 249 Id. at 115–16. Sunshine states: 
Employment status determines whether a worker is entitled to the minimum wage and 
overtime under federal and state law. Employment status also determines whether a 
worker is covered under federal labor legislation, such as the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) and its attendant rights to collective bargaining and protection from retali-
ation for concerted action. Only employees are protected by Title VII’s antidiscrimina-
tion provisions. In addition, only employees are entitled to unemployment, worker’s 
compensation, or Social Security retirement benefits. Although employers are generally 
not required to provide retirement benefits, if they do, these benefits are governed by 
the federal Employee Retirement and Insurance Security Act (ERISA), which applies 
only where an employer/employee relationship exists. The Affordable Care Act’s em-
ployer health insurance requirements apply only to employees. In addition to labor and 
employment law, employment status matters for myriad substantive areas, such as tax, 
intellectual property, torts, and criminal law. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 250 See 538 U.S. 440, 448, 450–52 (2003) (holding that courts should refer to the common law 
control test to determine if an owner should be considered an employee). 
 251 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111 (2018) (defining employer to 
mean “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each 
working day”). 
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ADA.252 Interestingly, unlike IRCA, the ADA actually defined “employee,” 
albeit in a maddeningly recursive manner.253 Under the ADA, an “employee” is 
“an individual employed by an employer.”254 Given this lack of statutory guid-
ance, the Clackamas Court turned to the common law.255 
The Clackamas Court’s resort to common law has precedent, as courts 
have a tradition of turning to common law in the absence of a clear statutory 
definition of “employee.”256 Clackamas cited the relative primacy of common 
law, noting that no particular entity form, internal agreement, or individual title 
shall sway the determination.257 The core of the common law control test is set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which defines the relationship 
between master and servant.258 Under the Restatement, a servant (i.e., an em-
ployee) is “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and 
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other’s control or right to control.”259 The Restatement further 
clarifies this definition by providing a list of ten non-exhaustive factors to 
weigh.260 These ten factors, however, do not always control the outcome.261 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444–47. 
 253 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111. 
 254 Id. §§ 12101, 12111(4). The Clackamas Court bemoaned that this definition is “completely 
circular and explains nothing.” 538 U.S. at 444 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 
318, 323 (1992)). In Darden, the Court faced a similar failure of the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 to define “employee.” See 503 U.S. at 319–20. 
 255 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444–47; Mastman, supra note 128, at 243 (“Confronting a ques-
tion not fully answered by the statute or regulations, [the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing 
Officer (OCAHO)] turned to federal common law for guidance. . . . OCAHO’s willingness to use 
employment law to define an edge of the employment relationship may make it more willing to do so 
in the future.”). 
 256 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444–47; Darden, 503 U.S. 322–23 (“In the past, when Congress 
has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to de-
scribe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 257 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450 (“The mere fact that a person has a particular title—such as 
partner, director, or vice president—should not necessarily be used to determine whether he or she is 
an employee or a proprietor. . . . Nor should the mere existence of a document styled ‘employment 
agreement’ lead inexorably to the conclusion that either party is an employee.”); see also Stephanie 
Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Who Counts?: The United States Supreme Court Cites “Con-
trol” as the Key to Distinguishing Employers from Employees Under Federal Employment Antidis-
crimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 761, 780 (stating that the Clackamas “decision makes 
it clear that neither the form of business organization nor an individual’s title determines coverage 
under the statutes”). 
 258 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 259 Id. § 220(1). 
 260 Id. § 220(2). The definition provides that the ten factors to be considered are as follows: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details 
of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
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Indeed, the Clackamas Court identified a six-factor common law test to deter-
mine if a particular individual is an employee, and one could argue that the 
Clackamas decision reduced the common law test to a single factor: control.262 
As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted, the Clackamas majority opinion identifies 
“one of the common-law indicia of a master-servant relationship—control over 
the work of others engaged in the business of the enterprise—and accords that 
factor overriding significance.”263 Thus, Clackamas set precedent in turning to 
common law and in focusing on control in determining whether a business 
owner is an employee.264 
2. Applying the Common Law Test to LLCs and Worker Cooperatives 
In light of Clackamas, to determine if IRCA applies to an undocumented 
business owner, a court will use the common law control test and examine 
whether the undocumented immigrant owner has significant control. With suf-
ficient evidence of control, the immigrant owner will not be deemed an em-
                                                                                                                           
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) 
the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, 
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular busi-
ness of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of 
master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
Id.  
 261 See Sunshine, supra note 248, at 118 (“In practice, the common law test takes slightly differ-
ent formulations across jurisdictions and agencies.”). 
 262 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50 (describing the “six factors . . . relevant to the inquiry 
whether a shareholder-director is an employee”); see also Mastman, supra note 128, at 249 (“The 
ultimate question under Clackamas is ‘whether the individual acts independently and participates in 
managing the organization, or whether the individual is subject to the organization’s control.’”). 
 263 Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 452 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the Restatement of Em-
ployment Law provides some clarity on how ownership affects employment status by asserting that 
“[a]n individual who renders services to an enterprise that the individual controls through ownership 
is not as a general matter treated as an employee of that enterprise for purposes of the laws providing 
protections or benefits to or imposing obligations on employees.” RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 1.03 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Complicating matters, some statutes (e.g., the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018)) specifically eschew the common law test and 
instead impose the “economic realities” test. See Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 
1440 (10th Cir. 2013). The economic realities test, used primarily to determine if a particular worker 
should be categorized as an independent contractor or an employee, consists of six factors, only one of 
which focuses on the common law control determination. The economic realities test consists of the 
following six factors: (i) the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s 
business; (ii) whether the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss depends on the worker’s managerial 
skill; (iii) the extent of the relative investments of the employer and the worker; (iv) whether the work 
performed requires special skills and initiative; (v) the permanency of the relationship; and (vi) the 
degree of control exercised or retained by the employer. Id. 
 264 See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50. 
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ployee. In Clackamas, for example, the Court noted that the owners of the 
medical practice were not employees because they “control the operation of 
their clinic, they share the profits, and they are personally liable for malprac-
tice claims.”265 Consider, however, the absurdity of trying to deduce if the 
owner of a single-member LLC is also an employee. In effect, one is forced to 
ask if an owner manifests sufficient control over him- or herself such that the 
law might justifiably consider the owner an employee. 
Absurdity aside, the question for LLCs turns on whether the LLC is a 
member-managed or a manager-managed entity. In short, an LLC may be 
managed either by its members or by a manager (or managers), who may or 
may not be members.266 In a member-managed LLC, the “owners are engaged 
in the daily operation of the business” and “[e]ach member has the apparent 
authority to bind the LLC in transactions in the ordinary course of business.”267 
This is in contrast to a manager-managed LLC, where the “operation of the 
entity is handled by a ‘manager,’” and “[m]embers (who are not also manag-
ers) of a manager-managed LLC do not have the apparent authority to bind the 
LLC.”268 Thus, if an LLC is member-managed, the member (i.e., the owner) 
has control over the operations of the entity.269 
Although no court has directly ruled on the question of whether an un-
documented owner of a business should be treated as an employee for the pur-
poses of IRCA’s Employment Restriction, there is some guidance by analogy. 
For example, with respect to tax treatment, the law has consistently held that 
owners of LLCs taxed as partnerships are not considered employees.270 Fur-
ther, if a court were to apply the common law control test to an LLC owned 
and managed by an undocumented immigrant, there is a strong likelihood that 
an owner of a properly formed LLC will not be deemed an employee. One 
scholar argues: 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Id. at 451. 
 266 See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 
47 BUS. LAW. 375, 385 (1992) (“Most of the LLC statutes provide for management directly by the 
members, although the statutes permit the parties to provide, by agreement, for centralized manage-
ment.”); see also MICHAEL A. CHASALOW, EXPERIENCING BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 245 (1st ed. 
2013). 
 267 CHASALOW, supra note 266, at 245. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Likewise, if an undocumented immigrant formed a manager-managed LLC, the requisite level 
of control may not be evident. For example, if a non-owner is appointed as the manager, the LLC 
owner would be under the control of the manager and would appear to lack the requisite level of con-
trol (i.e., the owner would likely be deemed an employee). 
 270 See Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1959) (“A partner-
ship is not an employer of the partners. It makes a return but the individual partners in their own per-
sonal returns account for their distributive shares of net income and net loss.”). 
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[R]ulings from courts interpreting other federal employment laws 
suggest that so long as members of an LLC have a “proprietary” in-
terest in the business—as demonstrated by their degree of owner-
ship, their control over management decisions, and the extent to 
which their compensation is contingent on the business’s profits—
they should not be considered “employees” of the LLC.271 
Rulings in cases assessing employment under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act,272 Title VII,273 and the Fair Employment and Housing Act are 
consistent with this assertion.274 Similarly, and in line with the Clackamas de-
cision, in cases where an individual shows ownership, engages in governance, 
and receives profits based upon percentage ownership, the individual is not 
considered an employee.275 Under this analysis, it seems safe to assume that an 
LLC owner is not considered an employee so long as the owner has managerial 
control over the LLC’s activities, a proprietary interest in the LLC’s business, 
and compensation that is dependent upon the profits of the LLC. 
 Unfortunately, the answer as to whether a member of a worker coopera-
tive is justifiably considered an employee is not as clear. If the common law 
control test is applied, the fact that worker cooperatives are owner-operated 
(i.e., owners have total control) strongly suggests an argument in favor of not 
treating worker cooperative members as employees. Indeed, a commonsense 
analysis of the structure of worker cooperatives suggests this conclusion. In 
this vein, some argue that because worker cooperative owners enjoy “equal 
control, the worker-owners do not have an employment relationship vis-à-vis 
the cooperative, and thus do not require work authorization.”276 Other com-
mentators are less convinced,277 highlighting a handful of cases that have treat-
                                                                                                                           
 271 Cummings, supra note 199, at 208. 
 272 Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1399 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 273 Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 984–85 (1st Cir. 1997); Equal Emp’t Opportunities 
Comm’n v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1177–78 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 274 Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 275 Cummings, supra note 199, at 208 n.119.  
 276 See Krishna, supra note 7, at 217 (“Worker cooperatives, businesses owned by the workers 
themselves, have taken root as a means of job opportunity for immigrant workers, including for those 
without work authorization status.” (citing CMTY. ENTER. PROJECT OF THE HARVARD TRANSAC-
TIONAL LAW CLINICS & IMMIGRANT WORKER CTR. COLLABORATIVE, A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF 
BUSINESS OWNERSHIP FOR IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS IN MASSACHUSETTS (2015), http://clinics.
law.harvard.edu/tlc/files/2015/09/TLC-Immigrant-Entrepreneurs-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R2BA-D76S])). 
 277 See Cummings, supra note 199, at 203 (“[I]t is not clear whether members who work on be-
half of the cooperative and receive patronage refunds would be considered employees under immigra-
tion laws.”). It is further noted that “a review of the few cases that address the applicability of federal 
employment laws to cooperative corporation members tends to support the conclusion that members 
would be considered employees subject to IRCA.” Id. at 203 n.104. 
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ed members of worker cooperatives as employees under the Federal Labor 
Standards Act,278 state unemployment law,279 and a state’s workers’ compensa-
tion law.280 For these reasons, it is fair to say that the matter is unsettled. 
3. Seeking Answers in Legislative History 
The legislative history of IRCA clarifies that the Act was never intended 
to punish undocumented owners of businesses. IRCA’s employer sanctions 
were passed to target employers who enticed immigrants to come to, or stay in, 
the United States and sought “to close the back door on illegal immigration so 
that the front door on legal immigration may remain open. The principal means 
of closing the back door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is through 
employer sanctions.”281 The primary motivation for the law was the belief that 
undocumented workers were competing with U.S. citizens for jobs.282 At the 
time of IRCA’s consideration, the unemployment rate in the United States was 
seven percent, and the legislative history notes that unemployment “is much 
higher among the minority groups with whom undocumented workers compete 
for jobs most directly.”283 The hope was that IRCA’s employer sanctions would 
result in “ending the magnet that lures [undocumented workers] to this coun-
try.”284 Beyond legislative intent, the Department of Justice’s comments to the 
final rulemaking procedures of IRCA also emphasized that the focus of these 
prohibitions was to target “those persons and entities that hire, or recruit or 
refer for a fee” undocumented immigrants.285 These proclamations make it 
clear that IRCA’s intended target was not the immigrant population, but the 
entities that hired immigrants.286 Thus, the legislative history strongly suggests 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (holding that homework-
er cooperative members were considered employees under the FLSA). 
 279 Builders Commonwealth, Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 814 N.W.2d 49, 52–54 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2012). 
 280 See Emp’t Div. v. Surata Soy Foods, Inc., 662 P.2d 810, 811–12 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding 
that coop members are employees under Oregon’s workers’ compensation law). 
 281 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. 
 282 See id. at 47 (“Undocumented aliens tend to come from countries with high population growth 
and few employment opportunities. The United States is not in a position to redress this imbalance by 
absorbing these workers into our economy and our population.”). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 45–46. Interestingly, of particular concern was the effect immigration had on black un-
employment. See id. at 47. A representative of the NAACP argued that “[m]any blacks are forced 
from employment rolls by the undocumented worker who is hired at a subminimum wage . . . . The 
worker is consciously aware that he/she has no protection . . . and will accept ‘starvation’ wages to be 
employed in the United States.” Id. 
 285 Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16216–01 (May 1, 1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 109, 274a). 
 286 See id. 
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that IRCA’s employer sanctions were adopted to address employers taking ad-
vantage of the perceived willingness of the undocumented workforce to accept 
low wages, thereby exacerbating unemployment of U.S. citizens.287 There is no 
suggestion that the employer sanctions were adopted to curtail entrepreneur-
ship. To be blunt, an undocumented immigrant who starts a business to be self-
employed has not stolen a job from a U.S. citizen. Because IRCA’s Employ-
ment Restriction was specifically designed to disincentivize employers from 
hiring undocumented immigrants, it would strain legislative intent to stretch its 
language to punish undocumented entrepreneurs under the technicality that the 
owner might also be considered an employee. 
4. The Ultimate Effect on Entrepreneurs and Their Lawyers 
At this point, it might be prudent to note that an undocumented person on 
the radar of immigration enforcement agencies would view this as a ridiculous-
ly theoretical discussion. To state the obvious, a violation of IRCA’s Employ-
ment Restriction is likely to be quite low on the list of concerns for an undoc-
umented entrepreneur. If immigration authorities were targeting a particular 
undocumented entrepreneur for deportation or removal, they would not have to 
rely upon a violation of IRCA’s Employment Restriction. Rather, the immigra-
tion authorities could simply institute deportation proceedings on the basis that 
the person lacks appropriate documentation to remain in the United States, 
rendering moot any nuanced questions of employment versus ownership. 
Despite the apparent picayune nature of this discussion, an undocumented 
immigrant might be wise to abide by IRCA’s Employment Restriction, no mat-
ter how technical or slight. This is because a history of unlawful behavior, 
which could include IRCA violations, might be held against an undocumented 
immigrant when he or she applies for some relief.288 For example, in In re C-V-
T-, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that, among other factors, 
“the presence of additional significant violations of this country’s immigration 
laws” would weigh against an application for cancellation of removal.289 Thus, 
to the extent an undocumented immigrant maintains hope of one day obtaining 
legal status, it might be relevant to learn whether business ownership violates 
IRCA because it might be considered an “additional significant violation.”290 
Further, as an example of immigration law’s many contradictory signals, an 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 57. The House Committee cautioned that IRCA’s em-
ployment sanctions were not intended to apply “in the case of casual hires,” which they defined as 
“those that do not involve the existence of an employer/employee relationship.” Id. It is not entirely 
clear what this means, but at least one court has interpreted this to refer to domestic workers. See id. 
 288 Mastman, supra note 128, at 228 (citing In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998)). 
 289 In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11. 
 290 See Mastman, supra note 128, at 228–29. 
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undocumented immigrant might find that business ownership is beneficial in 
any future immigration procedure. At least one BIA decision seemed to hold a 
quite favorable view of an applicant’s entrepreneurship.291 
Mixed signals aside, the fact remains that any technical violation of IR-
CA’s Employment Restriction is not likely to be a crucial question for many 
undocumented people. Nonetheless, the lawfulness of any particular business 
ownership might be relevant to the extent an undocumented immigrant con-
sults a lawyer to help establish the business. If a lawyer were to help an un-
documented immigrant navigate the bureaucratic odyssey of selecting an ap-
propriate legal entity, the question of whether the undocumented immigrant 
would be an owner (i.e., no violation of IRCA) or an employee (i.e., a viola-
tion of IRCA) is of vital interest to the attorney. As this Section makes clear, 
the question is difficult to predict. Regardless, many lawyers form businesses 
for undocumented people in an effort to help their clients escape brutal work-
ing conditions and achieve greater financial freedom.292 These lawyers are, 
presumably, working under the assumption that the formation of LLCs and 
worker cooperatives does not violate IRCA’s Employment Restriction. This 
conclusion is not outrageous, and given the unsettled state of the law surround-
ing the employment status of business owners, such lawyers can claim that 
they are operating under a reasonable interpretation of the law. 
The IRCA Employment Restriction, however, is not the only matter such 
a lawyer ought to consider. As the discussion in Part I.B set forth, the Ninth 
Circuit is of the opinion that the plain language of the Encouragement Re-
striction “criminalizes the simple words—spoken to a son, a wife, a parent, a 
friend, a neighbor, a coworker, a student, a client—‘I encourage you to stay 
here.’”293 Thus, it is not outlandish to conclude that impermissible encourage-
ment might include a lawyer’s advice to (i) form an LLC or a worker coopera-
tive, and (ii) structure the entity to avoid the possibility that the undocumented 
owner might be considered an employee. After all, the goal of such advice is to 
permit the undocumented person to secure safe, consistent, and humane em-
ployment, which would likely inform an undocumented person’s decision to 
reside in the United States. Indeed, framed in this manner, it is hard to compre-
hend how this type of legal advice would not constitute impermissible encour-
agement. As such, risk-averse lawyers might be chilled from engaging in this 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See id. (noting that in In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002), “[t]he fact that the 
respondent owned a business which supported her children was of great importance to the Board [of 
Immigration Appeals], which emphasized that as a single mother, she was unlikely to find a compara-
bly stable source of income in Mexico”). 
 292 See Krishna, supra note 7, at 216–17 (describing an effort to promote business ownership 
among undocumented immigrant entrepreneurs). 
 293 United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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type of representation. This discouragement harms not only undocumented 
immigrants, but also local, state, and federal economies. 
IV. A PARADE OF NOT-SO-FANCIFUL HYPOTHETICALS 
The Ninth Circuit’s concern that the Encouragement Restriction might 
reach intimate family conversations and political speech was enough to con-
vince the court to find the provision unconstitutionally broad. By stopping 
there, the Ninth Circuit did not conduct an exhaustive discussion of each so-
cially beneficial activity that might be chilled by the Encouragement Provision. 
It did not, for example, discuss how the Encouragement Restriction might con-
vince a lawyer not to advise undocumented entrepreneurs. This Part will dis-
cuss additional activities that might be chilled by the Encouragement Provi-
sion. In the interest of heeding the Supreme Court’s admonition not to indulge 
in “fanciful hypotheticals,”294 this Part will only discuss activities in which 
state governments, corporations, or people actively engage. These activities 
include lawyers offering any advice to undocumented immigrants, let alone 
advice regarding business ownership. They also include certain state laws and 
policies, public educational institutions taking steps to attract a diverse student 
body, and laws protecting the health and safety of workers. 
A. Criminalizing Legal Advice 
Perhaps the most upsetting consequence of the Encouragement Provision is 
the potential to chill legal advice. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not spe-
cifically addressed whether a lawyer’s “advice to clients” is protected by the 
First Amendment.295 Although the issue remains unsettled, there are a number 
of compelling reasons to conclude that legal advice should be protected.296 
                                                                                                                           
 294 See Brief for Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project & the National Immigration Project of 
the National Lawyers Guild, supra note 12, at 10 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 301 
(2008) and bemoaning the “tendency of . . . overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream 
of fanciful hypotheticals”). 
 295 Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, 
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1283–84, 
1343 (2005). 
 296 Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
639, 645 (2011). Professor Knake notes: 
Given the important nature of attorney advice, it may come as a surprise to learn that 
the First Amendment protection afforded to this category of speech is not clear. . . . In-
deed, most First Amendment doctrine addresses speech intended for public consump-
tion, while legal advice by definition entails communication intended for private con-
sumption by clients, who then control its public dissemination. The Supreme Court has 
not directly ruled on the matter. 
Id. 
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First of all, the very nature of a just and democratic government relies upon the 
freedom of attorneys to provide unfettered advice to clients.297 This is not hy-
perbole, given that “litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to 
a minority to petition for redress of grievances.”298 One need not look further 
than the Supreme Court’s seminal cases of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Obergefell v. Hodges to understand the import of this assertion.299 One scholar 
argues that “[a] necessary predicate to meaningful, effective litigation is the 
attorney’s advice to her client about the client’s legal rights and the proposed 
course of action.”300 If litigation is the only recourse to ensure the protection of 
certain rights, any law that threatens to interfere with associated legal advice 
should be regarded with suspicion.301 
Further, as noted by amici in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the En-
couragement Restriction could conceivably reach: 
[A]n attorney who tells her client that she should remain in the 
country while contesting removal—because, for example, non-
citizens within the United States have greater due process rights than 
non-citizens outside the United States, or because, as a practical 
matter, the government may not physically remove her until removal 
proceedings are completed.302 
Although some might argue (indeed, many have) that the government has no 
interest in prosecuting lawyers for giving legal advice, the government has in 
the past demonstrated its willingness to bring these cases forward.303 In United 
States v. Henderson, for example, the government argued that immigration 
lawyers violate the Encouragement Restriction when they counsel their clients to 
remain in the country while their cases are determined.304 The Henderson prose-
cution also argued that a lawyer’s advice that some relief might not be available 
                                                                                                                           
 297 See id. at 642–43 (“The role of an attorney in navigating and, when necessary, challenging the 
law is a critical component of American democratic government.”). 
 298 Id. at 643. 
 299 See Obergfell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 300 See Knake, supra note 296, at 645 (referencing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)). 
 301 Id. at 644. Professor Knake quotes Professor James Fischer, who warned that “legislative 
control ‘over lawyer practice may come to erode the ability of lawyers to serve as a bulwark against 
the aggrandizement of government power vis à vis the individual.’” Id. (quoting James M. Fischer, 
External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, 97 (2006)). 
 302 Sineneng-Smith, 910 F.3d at 484–85. 
 303 See id. at 485 (noting that “the government has already shown its intent to prosecute those 
citizens (attorneys or sympathetic lay persons) who give even general immigration advice” (citing 
United States v. Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D. Mass. 2012))). 
 304 See Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (noting that the government argued that “giving illegal 
aliens advice to remain in the United States while their status is disputed constitutes felonious conduct 
under [the Encouragement Restriction] because it constitutes encouragement or inducement under the 
statute”). 
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if an undocumented client left the country is comparable to “a criminal defense 
lawyer who advises a client regarding the prospective robbery of a bank.”305 
Two relatively recent cases might shed some light on the value that the 
Supreme Court places on legal advice. In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, the Supreme Court in 2010 refused to uphold the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision to hold the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 constitutionally overbroad.306 
The Eighth Circuit took issue with the statute’s attempt to restrict lawyers from 
advising clients to incur additional debt before declaring bankruptcy.307 The 
intent of this statute is to prohibit a lawyer from advising a client to incur addi-
tional debt without any intent of honoring the obligation; however, it also 
could reach lawful advice. For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that a lawyer 
might be prohibited from providing “advice constituting prudent prebankrupt-
cy planning that is not an attempt to circumvent, abuse, or undermine the bank-
ruptcy laws.”308 The Supreme Court disagreed, construing the statute to restrict 
advice that is designed to “manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy sys-
tem.”309 In a similar manner, consider how the Supreme Court might view an 
attorney’s advice to an undocumented immigrant on the specific type of legal 
entity that would avoid the reach of IRCA’s Employment Restriction. It is not 
unfathomable that the Supreme Court, citing Milavetz, could conclude that alt-
hough such advice is not designed to promote unlawful activity (owning a 
business is, after all, legal), it is impermissibly designed to “manipulate” the 
dictates of IRCA. 
At this point, it might be appropriate to point out that there are a number 
of lawyers providing advice to undocumented immigrants on various forms of 
business ownership, including those that avoid IRCA’s Employment Re-
strictions, and it appears that none of these lawyers have been prosecuted un-
der IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction. This prosecutorial restraint is laudable, 
but does not provide much comfort. After all, the Henderson court goes to 
great lengths to question the “dogged consistency” that the government’s zeal 
reflects to pursue the case against a well-meaning employer of an undocu-
                                                                                                                           
 305 See id. at 203–04 (noting that “an unadorned plain meaning reading of the [Encouragement 
Restriction] can lead to the conclusion that advice about what an [undocumented immigrant] needs to 
do—including the need for an [undocumented immigrant] to remain in the United States—in order to 
seek to adjust the [undocumented immigrant’s] status could support the conclusion that such advice is 
within the scope of [the Encouragement Restriction]”). 
 306 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231 (2010). 
 307 Id. at 239. 
 308 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, Milavetz, 559 U.S. 229. 
 309 Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 243. 
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mented immigrant.310 The court heralded the virtues of prosecutorial restraint, 
quoting Justice Robert Jackson,311 Justice Louis Brandeis,312 an apocryphal 
maxim attributed to the Athenian historian Thucydides, and Shakespeare.313 
The Henderson court’s intellectual musings on the appropriate use of 
power, while impressive, are a bit beside the point. The more concerning issue 
is not the potential for the government to occasionally exhibit inappropriate 
zeal, but rather the possibility of chilling protected speech.314 For this reason, 
any responsible analysis of constitutional overbreadth should not consider 
prosecutorial intent. As noted in Stevens, “the First Amendment protects 
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. 
We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Govern-
ment promised to use it responsibly.”315 Thus, any lack of prosecutions of law-
yers for violations of the Encouragement Restriction is irrelevant. The mere 
threat of the possibility of such prosecution is enough to recommend striking 
down the Encouragement Restriction. 
B. Rendering State Laws and Policies Ineffective 
A plain reading of the Encouragement Restriction not only has the poten-
tial to reach legal advice, but it also threatens a number of state policies and 
laws. Take, for example, the fact that thirteen states and the District of Colum-
bia currently allow undocumented people to obtain driver’s licenses.316 These 
states might consider this necessary for undocumented people to lead more 
comfortable lives by lessening an ever-present fear of driving without proper 
documentation. Advocates highlight the fact that many undocumented people 
                                                                                                                           
 310 Henderson, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94, 212. 
 311 See id. at 212 (quoting former U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson who said that “the 
citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness” (citing Robert H. Jack-
son, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 18, 20 (1940))). 
 312 See id. (“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the gov-
ernment’s purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment 
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” (quoting Justice Brandeis’s dissent in 
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have children who are U.S. citizens, and an inability to obtain a driver’s license 
makes it difficult to take those children to school, doctors, and any number of 
other necessary activities.317 Further, these policies are often justified by focus-
ing on the safety of all drivers, recognizing that an undocumented person with 
a driver’s license is less likely to flee the scene of an accident and is more like-
ly to cooperate with authorities. In Minnesota, for example, a county sheriff 
highlighted this benefit by testifying that undocumented immigrants “will be 
less likely to flee the scene if they get in an accident because of their status” 
and expressed optimism that “it will also make people more comfortable com-
ing to the police for any issues.”318 Advocates for this policy in Wisconsin cite 
potential benefits to both safety and the economy.319 From an economic per-
spective, advocates note that Wisconsin’s “farms rely on immigrant labor and 
they’re located in rural areas, so really the only way for those peoples’ em-
ployees to get to work is for them to drive.”320 In terms of safety, advocates 
emphasize that extending the right for undocumented people to obtain driver’s 
licenses will not only require those drivers to take driving safety tests, but also 
allow such drivers to obtain car insurance.321 
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 320 Id. (quoting Holevoet).  
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Although the justifications for the policy share similarities, each state 
emphasizes different reasons for allowing undocumented people to obtain 
driver’s licenses. As summarized in a report by the Latino Policy Institute: 
In Vermont, for example, the legislation to grant driving privileges to 
the undocumented immigrants of the state made economic sense, be-
cause most undocumented immigrants living in Vermont work on 
dairy farms, which are a substantial contributor to Vermont’s econo-
my. Granting the undocumented population in Vermont driving privi-
leges ensured that these workers could get to work. Nevada enacted 
similar legislation for public safety reasons. The premise of the legis-
lation in Nevada was that issuing driving privileges to the undocu-
mented population would ensure that drivers would have to pass driv-
er’s education and driving tests. Nevada also required that recipients 
of driving privileges purchase car insurance, ensuring the availability 
of greater resources for accident victims. Colorado’s justification for 
the legislation was that the cost of car insurance premiums will not 
increase due to losses caused by undocumented immigrants.322 
Similar arguments are echoed in New York,323 Rhode Island,324 and Massachu-
setts.325 Regardless of the justifications, a broad construction of the Encourage-
ment Restriction would ignore each of these arguments and could, for example, 
punish a person for driving an undocumented person to the state agency that is-
sues driver’s licenses. Helping them obtain a legal means of moving about the 
country suggests that the driver would be impermissibly encouraging an undoc-
umented person to stay in the United States. For similar reasons, an insurance 
agent selling an undocumented person auto insurance might also be prosecuted. 
Regardless of whether such an outcome is beyond the intended scope of the En-
couragement Restriction, these policies represent the type of state laws that 
might run afoul of a broadly construed Encouragement Restriction. 
The examples of state laws and policies that might result in multiple vio-
lations of the Encouragement Restriction are not limited to states that permit 
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driver’s licenses. For example, there are a number of states that extend in-state 
tuition benefits to undocumented students.326 Some states go further, extending 
in-state tuition to undocumented people and providing state-financed financial 
aid and scholarships.327 Many of these states require the applicants to have at-
tended middle and high school within the state.328 These policies clearly pro-
vide an incentive (in-state tuition) for undocumented people to remain in the 
state (at least for high school and undergraduate study). Consider the following 
examples of benign actions that would arguably violate the Encouragement 
Restriction: a high school counselor explaining in-state tuition benefits to un-
documented students who aspire to go to college; a well-meaning neighbor 
encouraging a high school student to continue to reside in a particular state, in 
order to maintain the potential in-state tuition benefit; and a college financial 
aid advisor who identifies the state financial aid packages available to undoc-
umented students. Each of these activities would appear to be a clear case of 
impermissible encouragement, even though they are furthering a state policy. 
Beyond driver’s licenses and higher education benefits, a broadly con-
strued Encouragement Restriction might also interfere with workers’ compen-
sation laws that classify undocumented workers as employees in the event the 
person is injured on the job.329 To justify the inclusion of undocumented peo-
ple under the protections of workers’ compensation laws, advocates note that 
“Latino workers, including both immigrants and non-immigrants, suffer fatal 
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workplace injuries at an alarmingly higher rate than other workers in the U.S. 
workforce.”330 If states were to exclude undocumented people from workers’ 
compensation protections, they would effectively “encourage unscrupulous 
employers to hire undocumented workers and then use their immigration status 
as a shield to escape full responsibility for on-the-job injuries.”331 By way of 
example, Case Farm, one of the largest poultry companies in the country, 
built its business by recruiting some of the world’s most vulnerable 
immigrants, who endure harsh and at times illegal conditions that 
few Americans would put up with. When these workers have fought 
for higher pay and better conditions, the company has used their 
immigration status to get rid of vocal workers, avoid paying for inju-
ries, and quash dissent.332 
Thus, there are a multitude of consequences that will potentially flow from a 
broad construction of the Employment Restriction. 
C. Public Universities and Private Corporations 
A number of private entities, public institutions, and individual U.S. citi-
zens currently engage in activities that could conceivably be covered by the 
Encouragement Restriction. With respect to public institutions, consider the 
following statement: “The University of Michigan encourages the application 
and enrollment of undocumented students—as well as students who receive 
benefits under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program—
who are academically excellent and accomplished in extracurricular endeav-
ors.”333 Similar policies can be found on public university websites across the 
country.334 To justify these policies, University of Michigan President Mark 
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Schlissel said undocumented students “enrich” the University of Michigan’s 
community with their “many talents, hard work, and the diverse perspectives 
and life experiences.”335 Such a statement, a laudatory pronouncement that the 
school would like undocumented students to apply and attend a particular 
school, would likely violate a broadly construed Encouragement Restriction. 
After all, this statement literally encourages (“The University of Michigan en-
courages”) undocumented immigrants to apply to college. Combined with the 
fact that around ninety-seven percent of the freshmen reside on campus, this 
statement clearly encourages an undocumented person to reside in the United 
States. Given that a number of schools have similarly placed a high value on 
undocumented students, it seems like a poor policy decision to enforce a law 
that would make it impossible to recruit such students.336 
A broad construction of the Encouragement Restriction also potentially 
affects the actions of private businesses. For example, in the face of the Trump 
Administration’s threats to end the DACA program, a number of companies 
spoke out to support renewal of the program.337 The President of Microsoft 
famously said that if the government wanted to deport Microsoft employees 
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with DACA status, “it’s going to have to go through us.”338 It is reasonable to 
assume that this statement, however intended, encouraged any undocumented 
Microsoft employees, in that it would fill them with hope. Such hope might 
reasonably lead undocumented people to continue to reside in the United 
States, comfortable in the knowledge that their employer promised to protect 
them. As such, the statement violates the plain meaning of the Encouragement 
Restriction. 
As further evidence of the reach of this statute, consider the fact that the 
Encouragement Restriction not only affects Microsoft, one of the largest com-
panies in the U.S., but also organized labor. A number of unions have begun to 
provide support to their undocumented members. For example, the Painters 
Union Local 82 secured an attorney for Hugo Mejía Murguía, an undocument-
ed union member, when Mr. Murguía was detained by Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE).339 Not content to stop with legal representation, the 
union “went all out on his behalf, holding rallies around the country to stop his 
deportation,” ultimately resulting in public pressure that led to Mr. Murguía 
receiving relief from deportation.340 To the extent such activity might not 
amount to encouragement, take note of Mr. Murguía’s statement: “A couple 
times I tried to quit. It was just so hard to stay far from my family. . . . When 
[the union] gave me letters and this support, that got me excited and I didn’t 
feel so alone about my case.”341 The activities of the union in Mr. Murguía’s 
case clearly meet the dictionary definition of encouragement often used by 
courts: “to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope.” Further, this is not an isolated 
event, as many unions have taken steps to advocate for their undocumented 
members.342 
Finally, consider the effect that a robust Encouragement Restriction might 
have on people who live near or in municipalities or states that have publicly 
fought federal efforts to use local law enforcement to enforce federal immigra-
tion law. Generally speaking, these efforts, often referred to as “sanctuary” 
laws, “restrict cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immi-
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gration authorities by denying ICE access to jails or not complying with de-
tainer requests.”343 Thus, if local law enforcement held an undocumented im-
migrant for a minor offense, they might receive a request to detain the individ-
ual until federal immigration authorities could assume custody. Sanctuary laws 
provide explicit permission for the local authority to ignore such requests. 
Given the potential emotional devastation of losing a family member to depor-
tation for something as minor as driving without a license (especially if the 
person lives in a state that does not issue licenses to undocumented people), it 
is not far-fetched to assume that well-meaning people might encourage undoc-
umented families to relocate to a nearby sanctuary city. Imagine turning to an 
undocumented friend and saying: “You know, you should really consider mov-
ing to Nevada, because then at least you could get a driver’s license. I’d be 
happy to help with the moving costs.” Such a simple, well-meaning act might 
be considered unlawful encouragement under a broad reading of the Encour-
agement Restriction. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the uncertain reach of IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction, trans-
actional lawyers across the country provide invaluable legal advice to undoc-
umented people in an effort to help them achieve financial stability. If IRCA’s 
Encouragement Restriction were to discourage this legal advice, it would rob 
many undocumented people of their best financial option, deprive federal, 
state, and local governments of a powerful revenue source, and further incen-
tivize unscrupulous employers to exploit the vulnerability of undocumented 
workers. Further, a broad reading of the Encouragement Restriction might 
negatively affect a number of socially productive activities. The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision to strike down IRCA’s Encouragement Restriction was sound 
from a doctrinal perspective, in that it refused to engage in a statutory interpre-
tation that amounts to re-writing the statute. But more importantly, it represents 
good policy. The decision was a breath of fresh air for the many advocates, 
lawyers, family members, and friends who daily engage in activity that might 
be perceived as unlawful encouragement. 
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